Athlete-agent agency in the South African Sport Industry by Moeletsi, Donald Tshepiso Molefe
COPYRIGHT AND CITATION CONSIDERATIONS FOR THIS THESIS/ DISSERTATION 
o Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if
changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that
suggests the licensor endorses you or your use.
o NonCommercial — You may not use the material for commercial purposes.
o ShareAlike — If you remix, transform, or build upon the material, you must distribute your
contributions under the same license as the original.
How to cite this thesis 
Surname, Initial(s). (2012). Title of the thesis or dissertation (Doctoral Thesis / Master’s 
Dissertation). Johannesburg: University of Johannesburg. Available from: 
http://hdl.handle.net/102000/0002 (Accessed: 22 August 2017).    
ATHLETE-AGENT AGENCY IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN SPORT 
INDUSTRY 
 
 
by 
 
 
DONALD TSHEPISO MOLEFE MOELETSI 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the degree 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
in 
SPORT MANAGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Wim Hollander 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     November 2019
i 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
The completion of this research wouldn’t have been possible, had it not been for the 
unwavering and incredible support, I enjoyed. I would like to express my sincere 
appreciation and thanks to the following people: 
• My supervisor Prof. Wim Hollander, for his guidance, support, supervision, as 
well as his constructive criticism, during the completion of my research. Without 
his advice and encouragement to keep pushing, I would not have had the 
wisdom nor courage to see this study through. 
• Dr Richard Devey, from statkon for helping me with my data analysis. 
• My mother, Percinah Maseabe Moeletsi, for her unconditional love, support, 
prayers and sacrifices. I am what I am today because of her hard work and 
sacrifices.  
• My grandmother in heaven, for seeing the potential in me and making me 
promise her that I will study until I achieve my fullest potential. 
• My grandfather, for always believing in me and making me believe in myself. 
• My sisters, Tshire and Tshia, for their support and encouragement. 
• My superiors at work, Hjalmar and Albert for their support and encouragement 
as well as for allowing me to take time off, at crucial times. 
• My fiancé and soon to be wife, Jonique, for her support and encouragement 
during countless hours of working on this research, during nights, weekends 
and holidays that we could have spent together. Thank you, it’s now my turn to 
support you in your studies. 
 
Last, but not least, thank you to God for giving me the strength, wisdom and the 
courage to persevere through the completion of this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
DECLARATION 
 
This is to certify that this thesis is my original work submitted for the Degree of Doctor 
of Philosophy in Sport Management at the University of Johannesburg and has not 
been submitted previously for any degree at any other university.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       21/01/20 
____________________     ____________________ 
DTM Moeletsi      Submission date 
 
 
 
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The development of sport as a profession led to the emergence of new professions of 
which one is that of the sport agent (Rossi & Tessari, 2017). The development has 
increased the significance of the athlete-agent relationship, with the agent acting as a 
mentor, guide, lawyer and most notably an associate with key responsibilities to 
secure, negotiate and manage the athlete’s contract with possible employers and 
sponsors. In South Africa, even though many professional athletes can amass great 
fortunes during their professional careers, many will face the grim prospect of 
bankruptcy when they end their professional careers. Some examples of athletes that 
faced bankruptcy in South Africa, includes, Philemon Masinga, the man that scored 
the goal that took South Africa to their first FIFA world cup in 1998, became a multi-
millionaire during and playing days, but lost it all in short period of time after retirement. 
He lost his multi-million-rand mansion and had to move to a back room at his mother’s 
house in Soweto. The other example is that of Thembinkosi Fanteni, a professional 
football athlete that loved the lavish lifestyle, involving highly priced international 
brands, spending money on women and expensive cars. He too lost all his fortunes 
shortly after retirement. In this context critics constantly accuse agents of 
mismanaging and exploiting desperate athletes by, amongst other things, charging 
athletes exorbitant fees for their services.  
The research question postulated was: “What constitutes athlete-agent agency in the 
South African sport industry?” The underlying aim of this research project is: To 
develop an athlete-agent agency framework for the South African sport industry, to 
address the lack thereof. The objectives of the research included undertaking a 
contextual literature review on agency and establishing the determinants of athlete-
agent agency in the South African sport industry, to establish expectations of athletes 
and agents of athlete-agent agency and to establish experiences of athletes and 
agents of athlete-agent agency. Factor analysis was utilised to establish validity of the 
relevance of questions related to determinants of athlete-agent agency.  
The research followed a descriptive explorative design utilising a mixed methods 
approach utilising document analysis (current professional athlete/agent contracts) 
with semi-structured interviews as qualitative and a self-structured questionnaire as 
quantitative research methods. The study sample for current professional 
athlete/agent contracts were nine (N=9), eight interviews with agents (N=8) and eight 
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current professional athletes (N=8). Questionnaires were distributed randomly among 
100 (N=100) current professional athletes.  
The research concluded that the athlete-agent agency in South Africa has the 
following determinants namely, the athlete, agent, contractual relationship, 
communication, fiduciary relationship, mentoring, cooperation, information asymmetry 
and three-way relationship. This plays out within the context of the relationship 
regarding the level of competence of athletes, requirements of the national sport 
federation regarding athletes and completion amongst athletes to access contracts. 
An agency framework was developed based on these results and recommendations 
for athlete-agent agency and further studies were provided. The paired t-test was 
applied to test the significant difference between expectation and experiences of the 
athletes in each of the determinants of the athlete-agent agency. The major 
recommendations from this study provide organisations and practitioners in 
professional sport with tools on how the athlete-agent agency relationship could be 
better organised. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
  
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Sport has a rich non-commercial history, but over the past couple of decades there 
has been heightened levels of commercialisation should continue to do so over the 
next two decades (Hinch & Higham, 2004). The commercialisation of sport is 
concerned with making money, and involves the activities and procedures involved in 
buying and selling sport products and services. Sport products are produced in large 
quantities in order to make a profit (Westerbeek & Smith, 2003). Economists agree 
that as output is increased, the marginal revenue gained from selling one more unit is 
larger than the marginal cost of producing this unit (Beggs, 2017).  Commercialisation 
has allowed sport to be one of the largest and fastest growing industries in the world, 
the industry is now bigger than the automotive and film industries and only slightly 
smaller than the retail food industry (Reed, 2017). In the United States of America, the 
sport market was valued at $60.5 billion in 2014, and it is expected to grow to $73.5 
billion by 2019. The figure was reported to be well over $71.1 billion and will grow at a 
compound interest of 3.2% to an anticipated $83.1 billion in 2023, whilst sport media 
rights are anticipated to grow from $14.6 billion 2014 to $20.6 billion by 2019 (Heitner, 
2015). The sport industry has enjoyed high-volumes of growth in the last decade and 
the whole global sport market – including infrastructure, events, training and sport 
goods – is projected to be valued between $600-700 billion. The growth of the sport 
industry is also said to be outpacing the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 
most countries (Au, 2017).  
There are three principal reasons for the commercialisation of sport. Firstly, sport 
commands a prodigious spectator appeal. Commercial organisations are attracted to 
sport that command this phenomenal popular interest, and will pay significant amounts 
of money to get involved. Secondly, the spectator appeal has allowed sport to 
generate substantial income, mainly in the form of revenue from gate receipts, 
television and internet rights, sponsorships, merchandise and licensing rights. Lastly, 
substantial revenues in sport, has allowed for the professionalisation and employment 
of highly skilled and experienced professional managers, marketers, coaches, 
athletes, referees and agents, who capitalise upon these commercial opportunities 
offered in sport (Westerbeek & Smith, 2003).  
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The professionalisation of sport as an organisational process of transformation has 
led towards organisational rationalisation, efficiency and business-like management 
and these have led to profound organisational change, particularly within sport 
federations, characterised by the strengthening of institutional management and the 
implementation of efficiency-based management instruments and paid staff (Nagel, 
Schlesinger, Bayle & Giauque, 2015). One of the main consequences of the 
commercialisation that has occurred in sport over the past few decades has been the 
increasing professionalisation of those who have been and are involved in managing 
sport organisations. The presence of strategic planning, human resource strategies 
and marketing plans in sport organisations has led to improvements in professional 
practice (Houlihan, 2013), and has allowed for systematic integration of a global 
market.   
The concept of globalisation took place between 1870 and 1914. It was only 
popularised in the late 1970s and coincided with the technological revolution and the 
rise in digital technology use that started to peak in the 21st century (Renzaho, 2016). 
The internationalisation of sport could be defined as the preliminary stage of 
globalisation, with mainly national sporting practices and events opening to the outside 
world (Andreff & Szymanski, 2013). The economic effects of globalisation on the sport 
industry is seen in, athletes’ astronomical transfer fees, such as the 222 million euros 
transfer fee paid for Neymar when the athlete moved from FC Barcelona to Paris Saint-
Germain F.C. (Gaines, 2017) and more recently, the four year-deal Christiano Ronaldo 
signed with Juventus worth 112 million euros (Reed, 2018), or the earnings in excess 
of 17 million Rands Eben Etzebeth stands to earn, should his move to Toulon in France 
materialise (Mphahlele, 2018). Further examples of the economic effects of 
globalisation include the emergence of the global club brands such as Manchester 
United, Real Madrid and Barcelona and the billions spent in advertising and 
sponsorship deals on these different sport organisations, not to mention the facility 
investments, the large audience, a highly profitable accommodation business, live 
broadcasts, advertising and the promotion of different brands using sporting platforms 
(Ekmekç, Ekmekçİ & İrmiș, 2013). The professionalisation, commercialisation of sport 
and the economic effects of globalisation have led to the need for agency in sport, 
whereby, the athletes and the organisations act as the principals that appoint agents, 
to provide agency services through their agencies to the athletes and the 
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organisations. For the purposes of this study the focus will be on the athlete-agent 
agency, whereby, the athletes appoint the agent to represent them to negotiate 
contracts and other services.  
Agents have long been integral in professional sport, representing athletes at the 
negotiating table and in some cases securing multimillion-dollar contracts, signing 
bonuses and endorsement deals (Piano, 2010). The development of sport as a 
business sector has further led to the emergence of new professional figures and 
amongst them, undoubtedly sport agents as influential actors worldwide (Rossi & 
Tessari, 2017). The globalisation of sport has allowed for sport agents to widen their 
scouting nets in search of talented athletes. For the purposes of this study and to 
accentuate the relevance of an agent, the researcher focused only on the noticeable 
trend of athletes emigrating from countries with a wealth of talent in a sport, to 
countries with weaker talent pools due to the popularity of the sport in that country 
(Crossan, 2013). The need for agents to assist professional athletes has grown as 
their earning potential, salaries, and marketing opportunities have increased. Salaries 
have grown as athletes have accessed teams and leagues’ growing revenue streams, 
particularly media revenues. Additionally, unionization enabled athletes, by means of 
athletes’ associations, to engage in collective bargaining and to arm agents with data 
and salary information (Barry, Skinner & Engelberg, 2016).  
 
In South Africa, even though many professional athletes can amass great fortunes 
during their careers, many will face the grim prospect of bankruptcy when they finish 
their professional sport careers. Some examples of athletes that faced bankruptcy in 
South Africa, includes, Philemon Masinga, the man that scored the goal that took 
South Africa to their first FIFA world cup in 1998, became a multi-millionaire during 
and playing days, but lost it all in short period of time after retirement. He lost his multi-
million-rand mansion and had to move to a back room at his mother’s house in Soweto. 
The other example is that of Thembinkosi Fanteni, a professional football athlete that 
loved the lavish lifestyle, involving highly priced international brands, spending money 
on women and expensive cars. He too lost all his fortunes shortly after retirement. In 
this context critics constantly accuse agents of mismanaging and exploiting desperate 
athletes by, amongst other things, charging athletes exorbitant fees for their services. 
Most athletes in South Africa spend the money made during their careers within the 
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first five years post their retirement and only 5% to 10% are able to survive from their 
savings (Mkele, 2014). In South Africa sport agents, have been accused of 
mismanaging and exploiting desperate athletes by, amongst other things, charging 
them exorbitant fees (Lekota & Nchabeleng, 2012) and to protect themselves against 
legal claims, agents in South African rugby have joined forces in forming an 
association to ensure the integrity of the industry (Rugby365.com, 2013) and in 
football, the South African Football Association (SAFA) has initiatives in place to 
regulate the practices of football agents in the country. The research could not find 
any relevant literature on the study of athlete-agent agency in South Africa and 
internationally there are limited recent studies available on the topic and those that are 
available are older than 5-10 years. These available researches only focused on: 
factors that have affected the relationship between athletes and agents by industry 
changes that have taken place in sport (Mason & Slack, 2001) as well as the 
importance of the athlete-agent relationship to the continued importance of the 
business of professional sports (Barnett, 2010). Hence, the study believes that there 
is a gap of data that can be used to establish expectations and experiences of athletes 
and agents of athlete-agent agency and to establish the determinants of the athlete-
agent agency in South African sport. Researching on the expectations, experiences 
and determinants of athlete-agent agency is therefore needed to be able to respond 
to the gaps that exist the athlete-agent agency in South Africa. According to Neethling 
(2018) the three major professional sporting codes in South Africa are football, rugby 
and cricket. It is within these sports where the majority of professional athletes 
participate for professional clubs or franchises. In the case of rugby there are 
approximately 494, football 500 and cricket 288 professional athletes. Without getting 
access to cricket players from Cricket South Africa,  the researcher only considered 
professional athletes and agents in football and rugby as representative professional 
sport for the South African context.  
From the above the research question emanates as: What constitutes an athlete-agent 
agency in the South African sport industry? 
 
1.2 AIM  
The aim of this study is to develop an athlete-agent agency framework for the South 
African sport industry. 
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1.3 OBJECTIVES 
• To undertake a contextual literature review on agency and determinants of agency 
that will guide the research design and methodology. 
• To establish expectations of athletes and agents of athlete-agent agency. 
• To establish experiences of athletes and agents of athlete-agent agency. 
• To establish the determinants of the athlete-agent agency in South African sport. 
 
1.4 CLARIFICATION OF CONCEPTS 
 
1.4.1 Sport industry 
The sport industry is a highly lucrative, multibillion-dollar business. Thousands of 
people work in various facets of the industry and it involves various professional sport 
such as baseball, basketball, football, hockey, rugby football and many other sports, 
whereby, talented people can fulfil their dreams (Field, 2004). Pitts and Miller (1994) 
define the sport industry as the marketplace in which the services and products offered 
to its buyers are sport, fitness and leisure-related. These products may include goods, 
services, people, places, or ideas. According to Pitts and Miller (1994) there are at 
least three segments identifiable in the sport industry which includes the sport 
performance, production and the promotion segments. The sport performance 
segment refers to the segment that involves buyers of sport performance, participants, 
fans and it includes amateur and professional sport, private and public funded sport 
(Margaritis, 2019). The sport production segment involves products that are necessary 
or desired to produce sport or to influence the level of sport or fitness performance 
(Pitts & Miller, 1994), and the sport promotion segment involves products offered as 
tools used to promote the sport product. This study will focus on the sport performance 
segment, particularly related to the athlete and agent that is instrumental to the 
business side of athlete performance in this segment. This study will therefore utilise 
the concept sport industry within the context of the professional sport participation 
segment, in particular the relationship of the athlete and agent in this context.   
 
1.4.2 Determinants 
Panwar, Kumar and Ray (2016) describe determinants as factors that decisively affect 
the nature or outcome of something. In sport related research, specifically team-sport 
6 
 
performance, Bishop and Girard (2013) see determinants as factors that enhance 
either sprint performance or the ability to recover from maximal or near maximal 
efforts. For the purposes of this study, determinants will refer to the factors that 
influence or form part of the athlete-agent agency.  
 
1.4.3 Athlete  
A professional athlete competes individually or as part of a team in organised team 
sport, including football, basketball, football, tennis, golf, athletics, skiing, hockey, 
rugby, gymnastics, figure skating and baseball. However, for the purposes of this study 
only athletes in football and rugby with be considered. They practice and train regularly 
to improve their performance and skills (Rosenberg McKay, 2019). According to 
Kapustin (2016) professionalism refers to the process of optimising the quality of work 
and its resultant outcomes. Schweiger (2014) defines a professional athlete as a 
person who engages in sport for a living and not just as a hobby and states that 
professional athletes compete at many different levels of proficiency, in different forms 
of organisation and get different rewards for participating in their sporting activities. 
For the purposes of this study, an athlete will be a professional athlete with an agent 
and forms an integral part of the athlete-agent agency   
 
1.4.4 Framework 
In the context of research Imenda (2014) explains that a framework for research is a 
structure that provides guidance for the researcher as study questions are fine-tuned, 
methods for measuring variables are selected and analyses are planned. According 
to Dickson, Emad and Adu--Agyem (2018) research without a theoretical or 
conceptual framework makes it difficult for readers to ascertain the academic position 
and the underlying factors informing the researcher's assertions and/or hypotheses. 
Rodriguez (2014) defines a conceptual framework as a mental structure that links 
concepts or a group of concepts together that are broadly defined and organised in a 
systematic fashion to provide a focus or rationale and a tool for the integration and 
interpretation of relationships between concepts in a more concrete way such as 
diagrams, words, mathematical symbols or physical material. Compared to the 
conceptual framework, (Bähr, 2016) argues that a theoretical framework identifies 
explanatory factors and specifies the linkage between cause and effect and it has the 
same logical structure as a theory but is more general insofar as it does not allow the 
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deduction of concrete hypotheses. For the purposes of this study a theoretical 
framework was developed that describes athlete –agent agency.  
 
1.4.5 Athlete-agent agency  
In philosophy and sociology, agency is defined as the capacity of a person or other 
entity, human or any living being in general, or soul-consciousness in religion to act in 
a world (Nelson, 2018). In business and in economics, agency describes the ever-
present relationship in which one party, known as the principal, delegates work to 
another party, known as the agent, who performs duties on behalf of the principal 
(Caselli & Negri, 2018).  In management, agency is one of the dominant theories of 
organisations and management due to its specific focus on the relationship between 
principal and agent. For the purposes of this study agency will be used to describe the 
relationship between an athlete and agent, whereby, the agent is authorised to act on 
behalf of the athlete.  
 
1.5 OUTLINE OF STUDY 
The introduction of the study, including the development of the sport industry and 
research question, aims, objectives, definition of terms and the outline of the study is 
presented in Chapter 1. In chapter 2, a comprehensive literature review will be 
conducted, followed by Chapter 3, which focuses on the research methodology, which 
includes the research design, research process, research instruments, validity and 
reliability, data collection, data analysis and ethical considerations. In Chapter 4, the 
findings are presented and in Chapter 5 the results are discussed and an agency 
framework will be developed. Lastly, in Chapter 6 the conclusion of the study is 
discussed and recommendations for the athlete-agent agency and further studies are 
made. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter one the background, the aims and objectives, as well as the significance of 
the study were discussed. This chapter will review literature relevant to the topic and 
in so doing, provide a systematic review of theories related to the study. Agency and 
sport will be discussed, to support the development of a model and answers to the 
research question. A theoretical framework will form an intellectual model to provide a 
road map of the study. 
 
2.2 AGENCY  
Agency philosophies play an important role in defining the agency/client relationship, 
since they provide different approaches towards understanding agency (Yeshin, 
2011). In general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to act, while ‘agency’ 
denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity (Schlosser, 2015). In sociology 
and philosophy, agency is the capacity of an entity (person or other entity) to act in 
any given environment (Souza, 2016). The philosophy of action provides a standard 
conception and theory of action. The former construes action in terms of intentionality, 
the latter explains the intentionality of action in terms of causation by the agent’s 
mental states and events (Schlosser, 2015). The capacity to act does not at first imply 
a specific moral dimension to the ability to make the choice to act, while moral agency 
is therefore a distinct concept. From this, a standard conception and theory of agency 
is obtained (Milne, 2013). Agency may either be classified as unconscious, involuntary 
behaviour, or a purposeful, goal directed activity (intentional action). An agent typically 
has some degree of immediate awareness of their physical activity and the goals that 
the activity is aimed at realising. In ‘goal directed action’ an agent implements a kind 
of direct control or guidance over their own behaviour. 
Human agency, describes how human beings are agents of influence and power, who 
are able to instigate and to bring about change. In this sense, notions of human agency 
are usually explicitly or implicitly associated with the idea that individuals make 
choices, take initiatives, and act proactively in order to exert control over their lives 
and their respective environments (Goller, 2017). Human agency is the capacity for 
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human beings to make choices and impose those choices on others. Therefore, 
agency is more or less distinct from the concept of free will which is the philosophical 
principle that choices are not produced by causal chains but are in fact extensively 
free or undermined by others. Human agency includes the assertion that people make 
decisions and act on them in the world. The capacity of an individual to act as an agent 
is personal to that person. Although consideration of the outcomes of specific acts, if 
human agency for others can be believed to advance a moral determinant, into a given 
situation in which that agent has acted. That is said to involve moral agency. If a 
circumstance is the outcome of human decision making, then an agent may be duly 
bound to apply a value judgement of the consequence of and be held responsible for 
a decision (Milne, 2013).  
In philosophy, the concept ‘agency’ is used in a much narrower sense to denote the 
performance of intentional actions. This way of thinking about agency has a long 
history in philosophy and it can be traced back to Hume and Aristotle, among other 
historical figures. In contemporary analytical philosophy, it is most commonly 
associated with the influential work of Anscombe (1957) and Davidson (1963) whose 
views differ significantly but who share the central doctrine that action is to be 
explained in terms of the intentionality of intentional action (Schlosser, 2015). The 
concept of agency is important for philosophers (who are interested in understanding 
what it means to be a self-determining being) and for cognitive scientists and 
psychologists (who seek to understand, for example, how some people can come to 
lack some of the attributes that are associated with fully realised autonomous agents, 
and how to prevent and treat such conditions) (Millican & Wooldridge, 2013). 
The concept of agency as a psychological dimension refers to the process of behaving 
with intentionality. Human beings exercise agency when they intentionally influence 
their own functioning, environments, life circumstances, and destiny. To posit that 
human beings, have agency is to contend that they are self-organising, proactive, self-
regulating, and self-reflecting rather than reactively shaped by environmental forces 
or driven by concealed inner impulses (Encyclopedia.com, 2017). Agency is a central 
psychological phenomenon that should be accounted for in any explanatory 
framework for human action. Psychological agency is not a fixed entity that conforms 
to traditional definitions of free will but an affective, embodied, and relational 
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processing of human experience. Agency is dependent on the biological, social, and 
cultural contexts that inform and shape who we are (Frie, 2008).   
Sociologists are interested in agency as the degree of determination of an individual’s 
actions by the society and the specific position they occupy within it, as well as in the 
possibilities of self-determination. The two extreme points of the structure-agency 
paradigm are, total determinism of an individual’s action by their social condition (the 
structure perspective), and total autonomy of the individual despite their social 
environment (the agency perspective) (Deters et al., 2014). Agency is defined as the 
ability to influence one’s life. It is implied as those actions that are intentional, in the 
sense that agency leads to actions that are intentionally pursued to exert influence on 
one’s life. When discussing agency, it is difficult to avoid mentioning its’ relation with 
social structure (Kristiansen, 2014). According to sociology literature, structure affects 
agency by shaping the opportunity for agency, as well as, by directly influencing the 
variable agency (Kristiansen, 2014). Sociologists typically address the nature of social 
structure and agency through the discussion of agency’s focus on non-routine actions 
stemming from, or attempting to address problematic situations, and suggest that 
agency involves the interplay of habit, judgment, and imagination as actors react to 
changing social circumstances (Kristiansen, 2014).   
Cognitive neuroscience aims to explain cognitive processes in terms of brain-based 
mechanisms (Ward, 2015). Cognitive neuroscience agency refers to an individual’s 
capacity to initiate and perform actions, and thus to bring about change, both in their 
own state, and in the state of the outside world. The importance of agency in human 
life cannot be understated. Social responsibility is built on the principle that there are 
“facts” of agency, on which individuals can generally agree (Fleming & Frith, 2014). 
Agency has two meanings in psychology and neuroscience. It can refer to one's 
capacity to affect the world and act in line with one's goals and desires―this is the 
objective aspect of agency. Agency can also refer to the subjective experience of 
controlling one's actions, or how it feels to achieve one's goals or affect the world. This 
subjective aspect is known as the sense of agency, and it is an important part of what 
makes us human (Haggard & Eitam, 2015). Neuroscience may help to build more 
robust theories of agency. Whereby, its insights into inter-subjectivity suggest that 
individuals within a social interaction create material, that is neural and a shared circuit 
creating a unique as well as stable connection between people. This new view of inter-
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subjectivity has profound ramifications for relational theory, which privileges these 
connections in explaining outcomes. Second, the shared circuit further suggests that 
the practices of individuals engaged in a social interaction are not conducted 
autonomously, where each actor is a unique and separate agent, but rather agency 
may be thought of as a joint endeavour, with actions derived from shared, rather than 
individual, physical processes (Holmes, 2012). 
From the anthropology discipline, the emergence of the concept of agency has been 
linked to Max Weber, who initially suggested that “acts be distinguished from mere 
(animal) behaviour on the basis of acts being seen to entail a number of features of 
human rationality: consciousness, reflection, intention, purpose and meaning”. Weber 
saw human action as being dictated by conscious choices (Zenas, 2013). The concept 
of agency has been employed by anthropologists and social theorists, especially those 
influenced by Max Weber, in contrast to structure, which implies constraint on action 
(Barnard & Spencer, 2012). Scholars in Anthropology argue that agency is rooted in 
biology. Some anthropologists see agency being rooted in a liminal period, where 
equal individuals change positions and, in doing so, strengthen the human bonds of 
society, or as a manifestation of the criminality inherent in humans. Some believe that 
all human beings are born criminals where human action is thought to be rooted in a 
deep-seated desire to undermine established societal rules and conventions to 
generate new ones (Kuate Defo, 2013).  
The nature of agency has been debated over decades in philosophy, psychology, 
cognitive neuroscience, social science and anthropology. In general terms it can be 
concluded that agency denotes the exercise or manifestation of the capacity of an 
agent as a being to act. Therefore, in broad terms agency is virtually everywhere and 
whenever entities enter into casual relationships, they can be said to act on each other 
and interact with each other, bringing about changes in each other (Schlosser, 2015). 
This study aims to look at agency in the context of agency theory guided by sociology 
dimensions, formulated in economics and business to regulate the relationship 
between principals and agents. 
 
2.3 THE NORMATIVE PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY 
Agency theory attempts to explain the relationship that exists between two parties (a 
principal and an agent) where the principal delegates work to the agent who performs 
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that work under a contract (Ben-Daya, Kumar & Murthy, 2016). Agency theory is 
concerned with the study of the principal-agent relationship. An agency relationship is 
a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person 
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf, which involves delegating some 
decision-making authority to the agent (Luhman & Cunliffe, 2013).  
Agency theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in the 
principal–agent relationship. The first issue arises when the two parties have 
conflicting objectives, and it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the 
agent is doing and whether the agent has behaved appropriately. The second issue is 
the risk sharing that takes place when the principal and the agent have different 
attitudes to risk (due to various uncertainties). Each party may prefer different actions 
because of their different risk preferences (Kurvinen, Töyrylä & Murthy, 2016). Luhman 
& Cuncliffe (2013) concur that the core of agency theory is concerned with how to write 
contracts in which an agent’s performance can be measured and rewarded, to ensure 
or encourage agents to act in the best interest of their principals, which is grounded 
on the notion that agents will have varied ambitions. Luhman & Cuncliffe (2013) also 
identify two main agency problems. The first being how to ensure the alignment of the 
conflicting goals that principals and agents have, as well as how to ensure that agents 
are performing in the manner that principals are expecting of them. These challenges 
can occur when agents make self-interested decisions and manipulate information to 
better represent their performance or service to the principal. 
The normative principal-agent theory treats humans as self-serving individuals who 
show no consideration or interest for others. This point of view can be considered 
extreme; however, the concept is not to act negatively toward individuals but rather to 
create structures and models that can produce the best results considering human 
fragility. The normative principal-agent theory allows for both agents and principals to 
know the negatives and positives of engaging in such a relationship, it can assist both 
parties (principal and agent) to design contracts that can create a win-win situation. 
The researcher expanded further on the agency found in economics and business, 
since this study is based on the economic and business aspect of the theory. 
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2.4 AGENCY IN ECONOMICS 
The agency theory paradigm, was first formulated in the academic economics 
literature in the early 1970’s (Lefebvre, Jiménez & Cabañas, 2016). Agency theory can 
be traced back to the seminal work of Berle & Means (1932) in their book, The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property, whilst Ross (1973) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
developed agency theory in such a way to reconcile the conflicting goals of 
professional managers and shareholders (Sirgy, 2001). Agency theory concepts have 
been seen throughout history. For example, for as long as people have done business 
with one another, the core components of agency theory and the types of conflicts it 
explains have existed. When farms first started selling their food to grocery stores, it 
created an agency relationship. When people started organising financial life into 
institutions like banks and investment firms, this also created a new type of principal-
agent relationship. Agency theory exists when an agency relationship is formed and 
conflicts or differences in opinion can arise in this relationship (Samoszuk, 2018). The 
domain of the agency theory was extended to the management area for determining 
the cooperation between various people with different goals in the organisation, and 
attainment of the goal congruency (Naseri & Addin, 2015) (see Figure 1). Agency 
theory has developed two streams – positivist and principal-agent theory – which 
share assumptions but differ in their mathematical rigor and style (Kleinschmidt & 
Bassen, 2007). Tan (2013) agrees that both streams address the same concern 
associated with the contractual relationship between two self-interested individuals 
seeking to maximise their individual utility, and that they differ in approach — the 
positivist is non-mathematically and empirically inclined, while the principal-agent has 
greater mathematical rigor but is non-empirically oriented.  
Positivist agency theory searches for conditions whereby the agent and the principal 
have conflicting goals. It also examines how the self-interest that influences agents 
can best be restrained, through the diverse forms of governance mechanisms. This 
stream of agency theory largely focuses on the relationship between principals and 
agents in large businesses. These mechanisms can be used to encourage the 
alignment of interest. Typical mechanisms available to large corporates in the equity 
market include pressures such as, liquidation of equities and hostile takeovers 
(Luhman & Cunliffe, 2013). The positivist stream emphasises finding circumstances in 
which agency problems could occur and aims to develop solutions to these problems 
14 
 
stemming from the agent’s self-serving behaviour (Tarrade, 2012). On the other hand, 
normative principal-agent agency theory researchers, are concerned with the 
investigation of the efficiency of contracts, in an environment influenced by different 
conditions such as information asymmetry, differing attitudes towards risk, and 
certainty (Luhman & Cunliffe, 2013). The normative stream emphasises how to 
construct the contractual relationship between the principal and the agent to maximise 
the principal’s welfare in a given context (Tarrade, 2012).  This study specifically 
focuses on the normative principal-agent stream, since it considers all principal-agent 
relationships (Huse, 2007). Essentially all the contractual arrangements contain 
determinants of agency and the normative principal-agent configurations are universal 
(Tarrade, 2012), which allows the researcher to apply it to the relationship between 
professional athletes and their agents. The researcher aims to structure the 
contractual relationship between athletes and their agents to improve the athlete’s 
welfare in the context of their careers in sport. 
 
Figure 2.1: Principal-Agent Theory Model (Source: Achim & Borlea, 2013) 
 
Figure 2.1 depicts the relationship that exists between two parties (a principal and an 
agent) where the principal delegates work to the agent, who performs that work under 
a contract.  (Kurvinen, Töyrylä & Murthy, 2016). The Normative Principal-Agent Theory 
explains how to best organise relationships in which one party determines the work 
while another party executes the work. In this relationship, the principal hires an agent 
Principal
Contracts
Agent
Hires & delegates 
Performs 
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to do the work, or to perform a task the principal is unable or unwilling to do. Agency 
theory assumes both the principal and the agent are motivated by self-interest. This 
assumption of self-interest dooms agency theory to inevitable inherent conflicts. Thus, 
if both parties are motivated by self-interest, agents are likely to pursue self-interested 
objectives that deviate and even conflict with the goals of the principal. Yet, agents are 
supposed to act in the sole interest of their principals (Junge, 2012). 
 
2.5 STREAMS OF AGENCY THEORY 
From its roots in economics, agency theory has developed along two lines; positivist 
(empirical) and normative principal-agent (theoretical). The two streams share a 
common unit of analysis: the contract between an actor that delegates and one that 
executes the responsibility. Both research constituents also share common 
assumptions about people, organisations, and information (Haer, 2015). 
 
Table 2.1: Difference between Positive Agency and Normative Principal–Agent 
theories (Source: Dinga, 2011) 
Positive Agency Theory Normative Principal-Agent Theory 
Assumes that individuals maximise their 
own expected utility 
Assumes that individuals should 
maximise their own expected utility 
Non-quantitative approach Generally quantitative and mathematical 
rigor 
Descriptive Prescriptive 
Empirically oriented Non-empirically oriented 
Focus on large, public corporations Applies to employer-employee, lawyer-
client, buyer-supplier, and other 
relationships 
Concentrate on modelling effects of 
aspects of contracting environment and 
technology of monitoring and bonding in 
addition to those related particularly to 
the principal-agent 
Concentrate on modelling effects of the 
structure of: 
− Preferences of parties, 
− Uncertainty, and 
− Information in the environment. 
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Deals with specific and focused aspects 
of the relationships. Such as the control 
mechanisms to limit self-serving 
behaviour and emphasis is placed 
almost exclusively on relations between 
owners and managers. 
Deals with general and wider aspects of 
the relationships. Such as the design of 
more general theory that can be applied 
to various relationships such as 
employer-employee buyer-supplier. 
Attention on scanning various monitoring 
and bonding practices as well as costs to 
determine contractual forms/ 
alternatives. 
Attention focused on risk sharing form of 
optional contracts, and equilibrium 
(optimal) contracting solutions (without 
agency costs). 
 
Both streams focus on the contract between principal and agent as a common unit of 
analysis, nevertheless, they contrast in their mathematical rigor, dependent variable, 
and style. Positivist researchers have focused on identifying situations in which the 
principal and agent are likely to have conflicting goals, and on the relationship between 
owners and managers (Rossignoli & Ricciardi, 2015). Positivist researchers have 
identified situations in which the actors involved in the delegation are likely to have 
conflicting goals and they describe the mechanisms that limit the actions of the actors 
that receive the additional responsibilities (Haer, 2015). The fundamental hypothesis 
of positivist agency theory is that individuals take full advantage of their probable utility. 
Thus, it recognises much more clearly property rights claims by both agent and 
principal, which influence potentially a pareto-efficient outcome in the design of the 
contracts (Dinga, 2011). Henceforth, grounded on this hypothesis, the agency theory 
requires that parties, solve their challenges, and explores how and by what means 
incentives and other determinants can affect the structuring of balanced contracts 
between principals and agents (McCall & McCall, 2014). This implies that positive 
agency theory is therefore descriptive. 
 
In contrast, the normative principal-agent stream focuses on how to structure the 
contractual relation between principal and the agent to optimise the principal’s welfare 
in a given context, varying uncertainty, risk aversion, information and other variables 
(Tarrade, 2012). The normative principal-agent stream is based on the normative 
assumption that people should maximise their own expected utility. Since it tries to 
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focus on shareholder value maximisation, normative principal-agent theory is 
prescriptive. This theory involves a careful specification of assumptions followed by 
logical deductions and quantitative rigor (Dinga, 2011). It provides guidance for the 
construction of control and incentive systems – regulative institutions – that attempt to 
align the interests of the cooperating parties (Ritzer, 2004).  
The research in positive agency theory is less quantitative than the normative 
counterpart (Dinga, 2011). Positivist researchers have focused almost exclusively on 
the special case of the principal agent relationship between owners and managers of 
large, public corporations (Tosi, 2009). The normative agency theory is mathematical 
in nature. It is built on neoclassical restrictive modelling assumptions, like a certain 
environment. The objective is to optimise contractual design activities in a way that 
maximises the utility functions of the principal and the agent (Dibbern, 2012). However, 
positivist agency theory has been criticised by organisational theorists as minimalist 
and by microeconomists as tautological and lacking rigor (Tosi, 2009). Whereas, the 
normative principal-agent theory literature has generally concentrated on modelling 
the effects of three factors on contracts between parties interacting in the hierarchical 
fashion suggested by the concept principal-agent: The structure of the preferences of 
the parties to the contracts, the nature of uncertainty, and the information structure in 
the environment (Sesselmeier, 2013).  
The normative principal-agent theory focuses on the voluntary contract between two 
parties which establishes a collaborative relationship in order, to come to a mutually 
profitable exchange. The theory starts from the assumption of perfect rationality and 
complete information and focuses on the causes and effects of conflicting incentives 
and asymmetric information in the application of a contract. It proposes to ex ante the 
contract in such a way as to offer incentives for the agent and the principal to reduce 
the risks of cooperation and to comply with the contract. In other words, to reduce the 
likelihood of adverse selection (to choose the wrong agent) and ‘moral hazard’ (non-
compliance with the contractual obligations). The underlying notion is that of a 
complete contract (Windhoff-Héritier, Moury, Bischoff & Bergström, 2013). 
Furthermore, the principal-agent theory concentrated on modelling the effects of 
factors related particularly to principal-agent, such as the structure of preferences of 
the agents and principals, the nature of uncertainty, and the informational structure 
available (Dinga, 2011). Thus, the question of what happens after delegation is not 
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raised by normative principal-agent theory. The possible developments are anticipated 
and included in the devising of the contract by formulating the right incentives for agent 
and principal, negative developments are therefore, to be pre-empted (Windhoff-
Héritier et al., 2013). Furthermore, unlike the positive agency theory, which focuses 
more exclusively on special cases of owner-top manager relationship, the normative 
principal-agent theory focuses on a broader and a more general situation that might 
lead to many more testable research implications. Finally, the normative theory can 
generally be applied to the employer-employee, lawyer-client, buyer-supplier, and the 
other agency relationships while the positive theory is extended to aspects related to 
corporations (Dinga, 2011). Given that the solution to agency challenges is to ensure 
that sport agents act in the best interests of professional athletes, this study aims to 
determine the nature of the optimal contract and the determinants of the relationship 
between the agent and the principal. 
Thus, recognising the wide-ranging scope and factors that interact in the principal-
agent relationship, it is found that the normative principal-agent theory is the main tool 
for this research study even though the positivist agency theory can have a 
complementary role.  
 
2.6 ISSUES IN AGENCY THEORY 
The figure 2.2 aims to describe the agency relationship that occurs between the 
principal and the agent. The relationship starts when the two parties’ contract, with the 
principal delegating duties or responsibilities to the agent, to perform as stipulated in 
their agreement. However, the two parties in the agency relationship are influenced by 
self-interest, which could cause problems in this relationship. The diagram therefore, 
depicts agency between principal and agents as well as all the principles that 
constitute an agency relationship.  
The diagram attempts to explain the agency, which exists between two parties, the 
principal and the agent. In this example, the principal delegates work to the agent who 
performs that work under a contract. The diagram consists of a circle with three 
segments. The focus of agency theory is on determining the optimal contract between 
the principal and the agent. The researcher therefore considered different 
determinants and issues that the two parties, principal and agents have to deal with in 
their relationship (Ben-Daya, Kumar & Murthy, 2016).  
19 
 
The three segments include the determinants of the principal, determinants of both the 
principal and the agent and the determinants of the agent. The top segment represents 
the determinants of the athlete, the middle segment, the determinants of both the 
principal and the agent jointly, and the bottom denotes the determinants of the agent 
towards the principal. The principal’s determinants include, agency costs, whilst the 
agent’s determinants include, information asymmetry, conflict of interest, adverse 
selection, and incentives and together the two share the following determinants, risk, 
communication, fiduciary duty, moral hazard, capacity, and cooperation. These 
determinants are discussed in depth following this diagram. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Issues in agency theory (Source: Murthy & Jack, 2014) 
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2.6.1 Contract  
The relationship between the athlete and the agent is governed by a contract that 
determines what duties are to be performed, and how the agent is to be compensated 
(Reade, 2010). The key determinant in the relationship between the principal and the 
agent is the contract that specifies what, when, and how the work is to be carried out 
and includes incentives and penalties for the agent (Ben-Daya, Kumar & Murthy, 
2016). A contract is an agreement between two or more persons which gives rise to 
personal rights and corresponding obligations, in other words, it is an agreement which 
is legally binding on the parties. However, not all agreements are contracts, in the 
sense that not all agreements are recognised by law as having a binding effect on the 
parties. An agreement is a contract only if it comprises a number of essential 
determinants (Du Bois, Bradfield & Wille, 2012). A valid contract includes: (i) 
Contractual capacity: It is essential for the parties to a contract to have the required 
capacity to contract (ii) (Consensus) Offer & acceptance: Parties to the contract must 
reach a consensus on the offer and acceptance of the contract. For an offer to be 
definite it should be complete, clear and certain. The acceptance should further be 
unconditional and consciously accepted by the party accepting the contract while 
remaining compliant with all the formalities set by law or the party offering the contract. 
(iii) Certainty; The consensus or agreement that the parties to the contract reach, 
should have certain and definite terms. Contracts that are not certain are abstruse, 
and a court of law will not endorse them. Therefore, there should be clear consensus 
between the contracting parties. (iv) Formalities; Parties to a contract should adhere 
or comply with all formalities set out by both parties as well as the law. In sport there 
is a formality for contracts to be in writing. (v) Possible; the obligations set out in the 
contract should be determinable, ascertainable and most importantly capable of being 
performed. (vi) Lawful or Legal; The contract should be legal and not in contradiction 
of any law. Similar to certainty, a contract cannot be valid if it does not comply with the 
law (Van der Ploeg, 2017). 
The contractual obligations of the agent to the principal can be negatively affected by 
the agent’s self interest in “agency costs” borne by the principal (Kessler, 2013). When 
an athlete and agent enter into a contract, they form a legally binding agreement in 
which both parties make promises that can in turn be enforced through legal remedies 
if either party breaches the agreement. In the context of sport, these contracts bind 
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the athletes legally to their specific agents until their contract expires or is revoked 
(Barnett, 2010). Given that contracts between athletes and agents are unlikely to 
include terms requiring the agent to act in good faith, or to avoid conflicts of interest, 
the common law of fiduciary obligation will generally prevail (Johnson, 2006). In the 
case, ABC sports management Ltd v Gary Botha (2013). The plaintiff averred that the 
defendant in breach of contract negotiated a contract without their knowledge in 
breach of their contractual agreement. however, the plaintiff pleaded that at the time 
of the negotiations they had already terminated the agreement with the plaintiff.  This 
example denotes the gap that exist in athlete-agent contracts and accentuates the 
importance and understanding of a valid contract by athletes and agents.  
Common law, is non-enacted law, especially that part of South African’s enacted law 
that has its historical roots in Western Europe, and in three main strands, Roman-
Dutch law, English common law and South African precedents (Van der Merwe & Du 
Plessis, 2004). Common law refers to the legal systems that progressed in different 
communities as part of their ethos and backgrounds relative to the building and 
organisation of their cultures and personal relationships within those communities. 
Common law has specific significance to family matters, marriage arrangements, 
customary marriage, the status of children, custodianship and childcare 
responsibilities, tradition, land occupancy and the conduct of public affairs 
(Justice.gov.za, 2018).  South Africa has an uncodified legal system, with the basic 
framework of principles of most areas of laws and the detailed rules on many being 
found in the form of the common law. However, no field of law today consists only of 
common law rules, since legislation has altered and supplemented the common law 
in all areas. Therefore, common law is the cardinal feature of South African law (Van 
der Merwe & Du Plessis, 2004).  
Fiduciary duty is a legal term or ethical relationship of profound sureness and trust 
amongst two or more parties. Fiduciary duties ascend whenever there is a 
disproportion of knowledge, training, or skills that puts one party at a relative 
disadvantage in a contract for services (Reich & Fischer, 2014). Fiduciary duty exists 
where a person or company is required to put another person's interests before their 
own. It arises from a relationship of trust and confidence, such as the relationship 
between doctors and their patients, directors and their companies, and agents and 
their principals (Scott, 2017). In a fiduciary relationship, a party who is in a position of 
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vulnerability and is therefore seeking aid, advice, or protection justifiably vests 
confidence, good faith, reliance, and trust in another more learned and experienced 
party. Thus, fiduciary duty represents, albeit as an aspiration or ideal, the highest 
standard of professionalism at either equity or law (Reich & Fischer, 2014).  
 
In the two sporting codes (Rugby & Football) this study focuses on, contracts that bind 
athletes legally to their specific agents until their contracts expire or are revoked 
(Barnett, 2010). According to Eisenhardt (2005) there are two types of contracting 
options related to duties performed: a behaviour-orientated contract and an outcome-
oriented contract. The behaviour-orientated contract is characterised by fixed billing 
rates and salaries, while the outcome-oriented contract is characterised by 
arrangements that emphasise conditional fees, bonuses for exceptional results, and 
deductions in the case of unsatisfactory results (Cook, 2004). Research done by 
Barnett (2010) on this particular phase of the athlete-agent agency found that the 
result of an athlete needing an agent to represent them and an agent’s willingness to 
represent the athlete to make a living, is the contract that is formed between the two 
to make their relationship a legal obligation. Thus, it is important for the athlete and 
the agent to understand the consequences signing an athlete-agent contract before 
they do so.  
 
2.6.2 Agency cost  
Both parties incur various kinds of costs. These will depend on the outcome of the 
relationship (which is influenced by various types of uncertainty), acquiring 
information, monitoring, and on the administration of the contract (Ben-Daya, Kumar 
and Murthy, 2016). Agency costs reduce the principal’s outcome or benefit from the 
contract (Clegg & Bailey, 2008). Agency cost can be divided into three types, the first 
monitoring costs, which are incurred by the principal with the aim of reducing the 
agent’s unscrupulousness as well as to rectify the information asymmetry that exists 
between athletes and agents. An example of monitoring costs in the context of sport 
could be the union membership fees which athletes pay to their athlete’s unions to 
represent them, to help them investigate and hold accountable unscrupulous agents. 
The second type of agency cost, is the bonding costs incurred by the agent. This cost 
is incurred when the agents market themselves to athletes as the most suitably 
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qualified agent to represent the athlete and help reach their career ambitions (Mason, 
Thibault & Misener, 2006). The third and final agency cost, is referred to as the residual 
loss. The residual loss comprises athlete’s loss incurred when agents do not act wholly 
in the best interest of the athlete. In sport, athletes cannot completely monitor and/or 
evaluate the agent’s efforts. For instance, sport agents can make a quick deal with a 
club, which is more beneficial for them than for athletes (Rossi, Semens & Brocard, 
2017). Other costs include, the cost of putting measures in place to monitor the actions 
of the agents. In their research Mason & Slack (2001) found that agents incur bonding 
costs to signal to athletes that they can adequately represent them in the variety of 
services required and that the athlete also incurs monitoring costs, aimed at reducing 
the problem of agent opportunism. Thus, athlete’s awareness of their business affairs 
increases so will their monitoring costs. In their study Barnett (2010) agreed that 
agents invest significant bonding costs in order to ensure that they have obtained 
minimum requirement to oversee athlete’s contractual matters. 
 
2.6.3 Incentives  
Agency further focuses on how organisations should structure relationships to provide 
agents with appropriate incentives (Lilien & Grewal, 2012). The normative principal-
agent theory, highlights how incentives should be crafted and governance activities 
focused to bring about better performance for principals when ownership and control 
are separated (Mueller, 2012). Incentives are integral to the relationship between 
athletes and their agents. They are used by principals to inspire agents to help them 
manage tasks that are too complicated or too costly to do themselves. As a result, 
athletes hire agents with special skill sets to perform these complicated and costly 
tasks, which includes negotiating contracts, marketing their brand, securing 
sponsorships and endorsements, just to mention a few. 
In sport, to overcome agency problems such as moral hazard and information 
asymmetry, athletes have to give appropriate incentives to their agents, to encourage 
them to continue their tasks as required. However, when athletes have sport agents, 
it is important to keep in mind that sport agents have to do what the athlete requires 
them to do (Rossi, Semens & Brocard, 2017). Agents earn their incentives via the 
percentage fee they charge their athletes, which varies in different sport and is 
sometimes limited and regulated by the various federations and associations in sport. 
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Generally, sport agents charge their athletes between four (4) and 10 % of their 
professional contracts, which includes their signing on fees, salaries or wages and any 
other earnings that the athletes earn whilst contracted to the agent (Gentile, 2018). In 
South Africa agents charge athletes a standard 10% commission fee when negotiating 
transfer fees and contracts on their behalf and they also charge football players a 
standard 20% commission fee when negotiating commercial contracts (Magubane, 
2018). In their research Mason & Slack (2001) found that agents are compensated 
based on the service they provide, which can be done in any one of the four methods 
namely, an hourly rate, a flat rate, a percentage of the athlete’s salary or any 
combination of the above and that athletes have been increasingly creative when 
establishing agent compensation schemes. 
 
2.6.4 Information asymmetry 
The overall outcome of the relationship between principals and agents is affected by 
several uncertainties, while the two parties will generally have different information to 
assess these uncertainties (Ben-Daya, Kumar & Murthy, 2016). Agency focuses on 
two types of information asymmetry. One type is hidden information: agents enjoy an 
advantage relative to principals in terms of knowledge about the outcome of uncertain 
events. The other type is hidden action: agents enjoy an advantage relative to 
principals in terms of knowledge about their actions (Ferlie, Lynn & Pollitt, 2007). 
Athlete representation is considered a credence good, which means that the value 
derived from the services cannot be readily measured by the athlete. Athletes only get 
to see the monetary value of their contract once they've signed, but they seldom get 
to know whether the agent negotiated to the best of their abilities and whether another 
agent would have done a better job. This is exacerbated by the significant gap in the 
knowledge-base and skill sets of agents and athletes (Parnell, 2013). In the English 
case of Imageview Management Ltd vs Jack, Kelvin Jack (“Jack”) found out about a 
side agreement that Berry (his agent) made with Dundee United. Once Jack found 
out, he stopped the commission payments to Berry. Berry then sued the player and 
the player counterclaimed for the commission already paid, and account of the secret 
profit. The Court found in favour of Jack and Berry failed in a subsequent appeal 
(Nixon, 2015). The representation of athletes by their agents is considered a credence 
good. This means that the value that an athlete derives from the service rendered by 
an agent cannot be readily measured by the athlete. Even though athletes get to know 
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the value of the contracts, they will not know if the agent negotiated to the best of their 
abilities. What intensifies this is the significant knowledge and skills gap that exist 
between an agent and an athlete. Typically, in this relationship athletes only know 
what they do best on the field, and have minimal or no experience at all of reading 
contracts and negotiating agreements. Consequently, this large knowledge base and 
skills gap strengthens the existence of asymmetric information between athletes and 
their agents (Parnell, 2013). In their research Mason & Slack (2001) found that athletes 
are unlikely to have the necessary financial, legal or negotiating experience to deal 
with issues managed by agents and in addition they do not have the time to nor desire 
to perform such duties but will rather that time is better spent on improving their abilities 
to perform. Thus, this creates an information asymmetry situation that favours agents 
in their relationship with athletes. 
 
2.6.5 Adverse selection  
Adverse selection refers to situations when agents misrepresent their skills to carry 
out the tasks and the principals are unable to completely verify this before deciding to 
hire them. One way of avoiding this is to contact people for whom agents have 
previously provided services (Kurvinen, Toyryla & Murthy, 2016). Normative principal-
agent theory, recognises that agents should be knowledgeable, therefore it is 
imperative for athletes to find competent agents to represent them (Vischak, 2015). 
Equally in sport, adverse selection occurs where the agents mislead principals by 
overestimating their level of competence or training; athletes thus contract with agents 
who might not be capable of performing the services needed (Rossi, Semens & 
Brocard, 2017). Smienk (2009) compares athletes and agents to buyers and sellers of 
services. The buyers of the services are athletes and sellers the agents. Athletes as 
buyers do not have information on the quality of services that agents offer. Information 
asymmetry that exists in the sport industry allows for a condition of adverse selection. 
Because commissions charged by agents are regulated, agents that offer high quality 
services cannot distinguish their service from the competition, nor are they rewarded 
for it. Therefore, the industry is at risk of a deteriorating level of service quality from 
agents, which worsens the condition of adverse selection in the sport industry. 
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2.6.6 Moral hazard 
The agency issue of moral hazard is rife in the market of sport agents (Smienk, 2009). 
Moral hazard arises when the action undertaken by the agent is unobservable and has 
a differential value to the agent as compared to the principal (Lohr, 2014). Moral 
hazard, refers to the lack of effort on the part of agents, in carrying out the delegated 
tasks (Ben-Daya, Kumar & Murthy, 2016). In sport, when athletes hire agents, both 
parties want to maximise their own objective function, in other word, their profit or 
utility. When the goals of athletes and agents are not perfectly aligned, agents may 
pursue their own goals at the expense of athletes. The misalignment, supported by 
the assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism, can respectively lead to 
improper market behaviours such as moral hazard (Rossi, Semens & Brocard, 2017).  
In South Africa disputes between agents, claiming to have a contract with the same 
athlete, are constantly reported. It is because of this bounded rationality and 
opportunism that athletes sign contracts with multiple agents. Football Laduma (2016) 
reported the dispute between agents, Ratshibvumo Mulovhedzi and Abbie Rasimphi, 
who disputed their eligibility to negotiate Justice Chabalala and Sello Japhta’s 
transfers from Free State Stars F.C to Orlando Pirates F.C. In this case both agents 
claimed to have valid contracts with the athletes.  
 
2.6.7 Risk 
If athletes and their agents have extremely divergent goals, the management of the 
relationship will be more difficult and require more effort (Reade, 2010). Agency 
assumes differences in risk attitudes of agents and principals arising due to a goal 
conflict between principals and agents (Bhati, 2015). This results from the different 
uncertainties that affect the outcome of the relationship. The risk attitudes of the two 
parties may differ, and a problem occurs when they disagree on the allocation of the 
risk (Ben-Daya, Kumar & Murthy, 2016). Good sport agents can furnish a holistic 
perspective and support clients to prepare for their post-career lives. Agents can do 
this by structuring agreements in a manner that will assure athletes of a steady net 
income and by mentally preparing them for the end of their sport careers. Professional 
team sport careers are all too short and without proper financial and career planning, 
athletes may find themselves at mid-life with no alternative skills and very little savings 
or income to show for their careers (Staudohar & Mangan, 1991). Generally speaking, 
potential risk to the athletes comes in the form of agents failing to fulfil their fiduciary 
27 
 
obligations to the athlete by wilfully not providing the athlete with truthful information 
in their application. Agents may also fail to successfully negotiate on behalf of their 
clients and they may fail to obtain the fullest potential when negotiating and 
consummating their contracts. Thus, in this relationship the athlete is subjected to 
accepting and approving the agent’s performance whilst relatively uninformed 
(Parnell, 2013). In sport, agents earn large amounts of money when they secure deals 
for their athletes, however they cannot lose any money. In this regard they have no 
risk involved. The failure of an athlete’s career is mostly carried by the athlete, since 
the agent’s risk is diversified by other athletes they represent. Therefore, the agent 
may take on more risks that the athlete wouldn’t have taken. However, there is still 
some risk born by the agent, such as, the time and money they would invest in 
athletes, even though this risk is minimal when compared to that borne by the athlete 
(Smienk, 2009). 
 
2.6.8 Capacity  
The issue of capacity is not included in the Murthy and Jack (2014) diagram, but was 
mentioned by other authors. Both the athlete and the agent should have the capacity 
to act in their respective roles. Certain individuals may lack capacity to act on their 
own behalf or appoint an agent to act on their behalf, including minors and insane or 
legally incompetent persons (Schneeman, 2013). Any person who has the legal 
capacity to perform an act may be a principal and empower an agent to carry out that 
act (Schuler, 2002). The principle is that parties to a contract must have the legal 
capacity to enter a contractual relationship (Sharp, 2014). People entering into 
contracts should have the capacity to understand the nature of their actions. Generally, 
individuals older than the age of 18 possess capacity. In South Africa a child’s capacity 
to contract is determined either by statute or by common law (Mahery, 2006). Statute 
law is written law that has been made by government. Therefore, laws made by 
parliament are called statutes or Acts (Gordon-Davis & Cumberlege, 2013). Under 
statute and common law, minors and mentally incompetent individuals may enter 
contracts but may also disaffirm them at any time. People entering into contracts 
should have the capacity to understand the nature and effects of their actions. Thus, 
sport agents agreeing to appearance or endorsements with athletes younger than the 
age of 18 enter into those contracts at their own risk (Masteralexis, Barr & Hums, 
2015).  
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2.6.9 Fiduciary duty  
Agency is the fiduciary relationship which exists between principal and agent, whereby 
the principal expressly or impliedly manifests assent that the agent should act on their 
behalf so as to affect their relations with third parties, and the agent similarly manifests 
assent to act in this manner or to act pursuant to the manifestation (Nixon, 2015). 
Murthy and Jack (2014), did not include fiduciary duty in their diagram, however, other 
authors do recognise it as an important issue of the agency theory. As such, the agent 
should act with the utmost good faith and loyalty to further the athlete’s interests. The 
agent is required to place the athlete’s interest first. Acts contrary to the fiduciary duty 
of the agent are considered fraudulent and voidable. As a fiduciary, the agent owes 
the athlete the duty to notify and the duty of loyalty (Schneeman, 2013). Statutory law 
has defined agency as a fiduciary relationship, and the law imposes a fiduciary duty 
on an agent. This duty involves a relationship of trust and confidence between the 
agent and the athlete (Miller & Schoepfer, 2018). Therefore, the agent owes a fiduciary 
duty to the athlete to avoid a conflict of interest, not to make a “secret profit” or to 
accept a bribe and to account to the principal for payments received, to preserve 
confidentiality, make proper efforts to negotiate and, where appropriate, conclude 
transactions they are instructed to take care of (Wehmeier, 2016). An agreement 
between a sport agent and an athlete (that is, agent and principal) gives rise to a 
fiduciary relationship. Such an arrangement involves the necessary trust and 
confidence between agent and athlete, with the agent acting for and on behalf of the 
athlete in negotiating contracts, sponsorships and the like (Johnson, 2006). Sport 
agents may not, without the consent of their athletes, use information acquired through 
the athlete and agent relationship in order to make a secret profit, nor may agents 
acquire any benefit through breach of their duties to their athlete. An example of this 
is provided by the English case of Imageview Management v Jack, briefly discussed 
earlier. In this case, “Mike Berry negotiated a contract for Kelvin Jack, a Trinidad and 
Tobago international goalkeeper, to sign for Dundee United. A commission of 10% 
was agreed based on the player’s gross salary, but Berry also negotiated a side 
agreement without informing the player under which the club would pay him £3000 for 
obtaining the player’s work permit” (Nixon, 2015). 
According to Johnson (2006) the duties owed by a sport agent acting as a fiduciary 
will also be determined by reference to the agreement in force between the athlete 
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and agent and a fiduciary relationship can co-exist with a contract. Nevertheless, in 
sport most agreements between athletes and their agents are transient pro-forma 
contracts which contain very few promises or commitments to be observed by the 
agent. The reason for this is that in most cases the agent exerts high bargaining power 
as compared to the athlete, who is often uneducated and commercially inexperienced. 
Consequently, it is for this reason that common law and fiduciary obligations will 
prevail, given that these contracts typically do not include terms requiring the agent to 
act in good faith nor to avoid a conflict of interest (Johnson, 2006). Barnett (2010) 
found that agents owe athletes they represent the fiduciary duty to represent them 
honestly, loyally and to the best of their abilities. Thus, an agent’s role in third party 
negotiations is to perform under their fiduciary and contractual duties to represent 
athletes to the best of their abilities and in the best interests of the athletes. 
 
2.6.10 Communication  
Even though, communication was not mentioned in the Murthy and Jack (2014) 
diagram, other authors recognise it as one of the most important issues in the agency 
theory. Agents have a fiduciary duty to notify principals of information learned that 
affects the subject of the agency, including all material facts of which the agent has 
knowledge. Agents are required to make full, fair, and prompt disclosure of all facts 
that are currently, or may in the future, be material to the matter for which agents are 
employed, if that information might affect the principal’s rights and interests or if that 
knowledge may affect the principal’s actions. Outsiders dealing with agents have the 
right to assume that important and relevant information they give to the agents will be 
provided to principals (Schneeman, 2013). Agents have to communicate all necessary 
information available to their principals and comply with reasonable instructions 
provided by them (Wehmeier, 2016). Communication allows for mutual understanding 
and formation of attributes such as goals, beliefs and values, and promotes the 
development of the agent-athlete relationship (Iordanou, Hawley & Iordanou, 2017). 
With good communication the relationship between the agent and the athlete can allow 
both parties to successfully achieve their set objectives. The agent could aid the 
athlete to procure the best possible professional contracts, obtain endorsements, 
receive quality health care, and promote the athlete’s brand as well as to help arrange 
athlete’s lives after their professional sport career.  
 
30 
 
2.6.11 Conflict of interest 
Unless otherwise agreed, agents may not act for two principals whose interests are in 
conflict (Schneeman, 2013). Although, Murthy and Jack (2014), did not explicitly 
recognise conflict of interest as an issue in agency theory, the literature review 
revealed that it is an important issue in agency theory. Agents should refrain from 
putting themselves in a position that would ordinarily encourage a conflict between 
their own interests and those of principals (Schuler, 2002). One of the key 
determinants of agency is opportunism, if agents have a discretion which they are 
supposed to exercise for the benefit of another, they may exercise it to maximise their 
own utility instead (Kostyuk, Stiglbauer & Govorun, 2016). Conflict of interest is “one 
of the predominant ethical dilemmas in sport representation”. Primarily due to the 
consolidation of the sport agency business, it is relatively common for athletes’ agents 
to represent more than one athlete from the same team and position in a team. In such 
cases, those athletes will be seeking contracts from the same team management, with 
the same agent representing them in those negotiations. It is not difficult to imagine 
situations where the agent is placed in a position to compromise the demands of one 
client in order to seek a more favourable contract for the other; to consciously or 
unconsciously favour the interests of one client over the other; or to use the bargaining 
power of one client to improve the negotiating position of the other client. The conflict 
is further exacerbated in sport where a salary cap is in force and the athletes are 
dividing a fixed amount of money (Johnson, 2006). In the case of Imageview 
Management v Jack, there was a case of conflict of interest when Berry who was 
contracted to Jack as an agent, had a side agreement with Dundee United for Jack’s 
transfer to their club. Because of this side agreement Berry was only interested in 
moving Jack to Dundee United, as opposed to any other club (Nixon, 2015). Other 
potential conflict of interest situations unique to the athlete-agent relationship includes: 
agents representing athletes from the same team, agents representing the athlete, 
coach and having a very close relationship with the employer, when agents have to 
decide which of the athletes in their stable to propose for endorsement deals (Johnson, 
2006). 
 
2.6.12 Cooperation  
Cooperation does not form part of the issues in agency theory as identified by Murthy 
and Jack (214), however, it remains an important issue in agency, as revealed by other 
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authors. Normative principal agent theory focusses on cooperation in the presence of 
external effects and asymmetric information (Bamberg & Spremann, 1987). Principals 
require the maximum effort and cooperation of agents to achieve their goals in 
contracts (Balago, 2014). The aim and objectives of contracts between athletes and 
agents are achievable when cooperation between them exists in abundance. Through 
cooperation, minimal or no agency costs would be incurred. Cooperation inspires 
confidence and trust in athletes in their selection of agents and eliminates conditions 
of moral hazard, conflict of interest, information asymmetry and risk while the fiduciary 
duty will be sustained. Thus, cooperation will maximise the benefits of agency between 
athletes and agents. Barnett (2010) found that for mutual understanding to exist in the 
athlete-agent relationship, as part of fiduciary duty agents have to agree to represent 
their clients to the best of their abilities and in the athletes’ best interests and in return 
for their loyalty, athletes should agree to perform the duties laid out to them within their 
agency contracts.  
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
Chapter 2 reviewed relevant literature to validate an in depth understanding of agency 
which included literature on agency philosophies, agency in economics, a review of 
the agency theory and its different streams as well as the issues encountered in 
agency theory, namely; contract, agency cost, incentives, information asymmetry, 
adverse selection, moral hazard, risk, capacity, fiduciary duty, communication, conflict 
of interest and cooperation. Chapter Three will focus on the research design and 
methodology applied to conduct this study.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will examine the research methodology that was used to conduct the 
research. The research methodology includes, the research design, research setting, 
population and sample, inclusion and exclusion criteria for sampling, research 
instruments, validity and reliability, data collection, data analysis, as well as the ethical 
considerations and summary. 
 
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY   
 
This research followed a descriptive design utilising a sequential mixed methods 
approach. Descriptive designs are used to describe in detail a phenomenon of interest, 
they provide a representation of a situation it is deprived of manipulating any variables. 
This design was appropriate for this study to allow the researcher to describe the 
current athlete-agent agency practices in South Africa, as well as to allow the 
researcher to identify and document the different characteristics of the athlete-agent 
agency (Schmidt and Brown, 2012). The sequential approach involved three phases 
which included; the collection, analysis and evaluation of quantitative data 
(questionnaire) (phase one);  arranging, conducting interviews, analysing and 
evaluating the qualitative data (document analysis and semi-structured interviews) 
(phase two) and; using qualitative data to contextualise the quantitative findings 
(phase three) (Bowen, Rose and Pilkington, 2017). 
Shannon-Baker (2016) explains mixed methods research as a type of research where 
there is an intentional mixture of both qualitative and quantitative approaches in a 
single research study. The fundamental hypothesis of mixed methods research is that 
it comprehensively addresses questions more than qualitative and quantitative 
methods do, when used alone. Broad and complex questions can be addressed using 
the mixed methods design, using both quantitative and qualitative methods to explore 
those (Tariq & Woodman, 2013). One other advantage of using the mixed methods 
approach is that it provides solutions to the disadvantages experienced when using a 
qualitative or quantitative method in isolation (Brierley, 2017). 
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A descriptive design was used to describe the agency between professional athletes 
in rugby and football and their agents. The experiences and expectations of 
professional athletes of the agency relationship they share with their agents was 
measured against the determinants of agency, namely contracts, capacity, loyalty, 
conflict of interest, ethics, trust and communication. Joy (2014) states that descriptive 
research is used to describe characteristics of a population or phenomenon being 
studied. However, descriptive design does not aim to answer questions about how or 
when or why the characteristics occurred, instead, descriptive design aims to 
addresses what the question is. Hale (2018), concedes that descriptive design 
methods describe situations and they do not make accurate predictions and nor do 
they determine any cause and effect. There are three types of descriptive design 
methods namely, observational, case-study and surveys. In this study the survey type 
of descriptive research was used, where participants answered questions through 
interviews and questionnaires (Jamie Hale, 2019). The researcher then described the 
responses given after the participants answered the questions. The design was also 
used to determine the gap that exists between the expectations and experiences of 
the agency relationship between professional athletes and their agents.  
This design was considered to be the most suitable for the study, for the reason that 
it was able to remedy the weakness of only using quantitative methodology or only 
qualitative methodology. The two-phase structure made it easier to implement, and 
allowed the researcher to conduct the two methods in separate phases, after which 
collection was done on one type of data at a point in time. This made it possible for 
the study to be conducted by a single researcher and did not require a research team.  
 
3.2.1 Research setting 
The research setting of this study involves the South African sport industry, with a 
specific focus on the professional athletes and agents, in two sporting federations 
namely; rugby and football. According to Neethling (2018) the three major professional 
sporting codes in South Africa are football, rugby and cricket. It is within these sports 
where the majority of professional athletes participate for professional clubs or 
franchises. In the case of rugby there are approximately 494, football 500 and cricket 
288 professional athletes. Without getting access to cricket players from Cricket South 
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Africa, the researcher considered professional athletes and agents in football and 
rugby as representative professional sports for the South African context.  
 In the context of this study sport federations and clubs (employers) reward 
professional athletes with contracts, while agents represent athletes in negotiations 
and execution of these contracts. Furthermore, player and agent unions/associations 
also represent professional athletes and agents regarding fair and ethical conduct of 
employers and athletes. This complex situation forms the setting in which the study 
will be undertaken. 
 
3.2.2 Population and sample 
The study population for document analysis of this study consists of all athlete/sport 
agent contracts in rugby and football that exists in South Africa. 
The study population for the semi-structured interviews consist of: All rugby and 
football agents managing athletes in South Africa who have been operating as an 
agent for at least one year and all professional male athletes in South Africa in rugby 
and football older than 18 years who had sport agents for more than one year.  
 
The study population for the questionnaires consisted of all professional male athletes 
in rugby and football in South Africa who are older than 18 years with agents for more 
than one year. The rationale for using only male athletes is that in South Africa male 
sport has been predominantly professionalised while athletes older than 18 years have 
the legal capacity to sign professional contracts and may accept or decline 
participation in this study.  
 
3.2.2.1 Inclusion and exclusion criteria for sampling 
 
Inclusion criteria for the questionnaire 
The inclusion criteria for the questionnaire includes all male professional athletes older 
than 18 years with agents for a year or longer in rugby and football in South Africa. 
 
Inclusion criteria for semi-structured interviews 
The inclusion criteria for semi-structured interviews included, professional athletes 
with contracts in rugby and football in South Africa. It also included agents, with at 
least one-year experience in the sport industry. The agent could be of any age group. 
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The sample included both male and female agents that represented male athletes in 
rugby and football. In terms of athletes the sample included male professional athletes 
in rugby and football, as well as athletes older than 18 years, represented by an agent 
a year or longer.  
 
Inclusion criteria for document analysis  
The inclusion criteria for the document analysis includes all the contracts between 
male professional athletes older than 18 years and their agents in rugby and football 
in South Africa, with the contract relationship exceeding a year. 
 
Exclusion criteria for the questionnaire 
Questionnaires excluded, agents with athletes that were not participating in rugby and 
football in South Africa, with less than one year of experience in rugby and football 
and those that represent athletes in other sport, excluding rugby and football in South 
Africa.  Employers of professional athlete’s rugby and football in South Africa were 
also excluded. The study similarly excluded, unions for professional athletes that are 
not in rugby and football in South Africa, professional male athletes that were not 
participating in rugby, and football in South Africa, all non-professional athletes in 
rugby and football in South Africa, athletes that have only been professional for less 
than one year and athletes younger than 18 years. Questionnaires excluded, 
professional male athletes that were not participating in rugby and football in South 
Africa, all non-professional athletes in rugby, and football in South Africa and athletes 
younger than 18 years and those being professional for less than one year.  
 
Exclusion criteria for semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews excluded, agents with athletes that were not participating 
in rugby and football in South Africa, with less than one year of experience in rugby 
and football and those that represent athletes in other sport, outside rugby and football 
in South Africa.  Employers of professional athletes outside rugby and football in South 
Africa were also excluded. The study similarly excluded, unions for professional 
athletes that are not in rugby and football in South Africa, professional male athletes 
that were not participating in rugby, and football in South Africa, all non-professional 
athletes in rugby and football in South Africa, athletes that have only been professional 
for less than one year and athletes younger than 18 years. 
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Exclusion criteria for document analysis  
The document analysis excluded all the contracts for athletes that are not professional 
in rugby, football or any other sport in and outside of South Africa as well as agents’ 
contracts with athletes younger than 18 years and those that have had their agent’s 
contracts for less than a year. 
 
Sample – questionnaires and interviews 
Given the difficulty and expense of obtaining information from every single person in 
a population, researchers often choose to obtain a representative sample from the 
population. A sample is a subset of the population that represents the full population 
(Adams and Lawrence, 2015). The researcher first had to establish, the study’s 
desired sample. This sample was obtained using the snowball sampling technique. 
According to Crossman (2018) the snowball sampling technique refers to a non-
probability sampling technique in which a researcher begins with a small population of 
known individuals and expands the sample by asking those initial participants to 
identify others that should participate in the study. When researchers use this 
technique, they start by identifying at least one person from their sample. Then 
subsequently, use the guidance from the first person, to select the next person, based 
on their knowledge on which other respondents would qualify as a participant in the 
study (Blankenship, 2010). The snowball technique in sampling is normally 
appropriate to use when sampling a special population where the members are difficult 
to identify and locate (Rubin and Babbie, 2009). Although the method proved to be 
cumbersome, the researcher managed to successfully achieve the study’s desired 
sample size.   
This study made use of a non-probability, judgement sampling since the athletes, 
agents and contracts that were selected for this study did not have an equal chance 
of being included in the sample and an effort was made to include the different types 
of athletes, agents and contracts. The pool of the sample respondents was derived 
through the snowball technique starting with the initial respondents selected by 
probability samples and gave access to additional respondents are obtained by 
referral from initial respondents. The total number of professional athletes in rugby and 
football are unknown to the researcher, therefore, random sampling was appropriate 
for this study. 
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The sample of the study was as follows: 
• A random sample of three (n=3) athlete-agent contracts from rugby and football 
(sport federations) (N=9); 
• A purposive sample for semi-structured interviews existing of at least: 
o Four agents (n=4) in each sport (N= All the agents in Rugby and Football); 
o Four athletes (n=4) in each sport (N1 = All the athletes in each sport). 
• A random sample of at least fifty (n=50) professional athletes in each sport (N=100) 
was selected to complete the questionnaire. The sample of 50 athletes per spots 
was calculated as 10% of the approximate number of professional athletes in both 
rugby and football.  
 
3.3 RESEARCH PROCESS 
The researcher first administered the questionnaires, through email invitations and to 
reach a large number of respondents, the researcher attended training camps and 
self-administered the questionnaires, then analysed the results. Once the 
questionnaires were answered and analysed, the researcher conducted semi-
structured interviews with open-ended questions similar to those used in the 
questionnaire. To collect quantitative data, interviews were used to aid the researcher 
to attain the thoughts and feelings of research participants. This allowed the 
researcher to successfully develop a thorough understanding of the meaning of the 
experiences that athletes and agents ascribe to. Using qualitative methods supported 
the researcher in understanding how and why certain behaviours take place. These 
semi-structured interviews provided a contextual understanding of the data collected 
in the quantitative phase of the study (Stuckey, 2013). Qualitative methods allowed 
the researcher to examine the intricate interrelationship of variables measured in the 
questionnaire, since the questionnaire naturally only reveals limited information about 
the nature of this relationship.  
 
3.4  RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS 
The researcher selected to use various instruments to collect data, which included 
questionnaires, interviews and document analysis. The statistical consultation 
services at the University of Johannesburg provided the researcher with consultation 
services on the construction of an effective questionnaire. The interview questions 
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were developed from those approved in the questionnaire. Agency contracts that were 
signed by athletes and agents also formed part of the research instruments.  
 
3.4.1 Questionnaire for athletes 
Guided by literature review that included studies and research a three-part 
questionnaire was designed, section A: Biographical information, Section B: Agency 
expectations and Section C: Agency experiences. Section A of the questionnaire 
required the participants to provide their biographical information. To ensure 
anonymity the participants were not asked to provide their names. Nevertheless, the 
participants were asked to indicate in which sport they were professionals, the length 
of time in which they’ve been professionals in their respective sport, their age in years, 
the level of sport they participate in and for how long their current agent has been with 
them. Section B of the questionnaire consisted of 36 items and requested respondents 
to indicate their expectations of a relationship with agents, on a 5-point Likert scale. 
Section C of the questionnaire consisted of 36 items and focussed on the athlete’s 
experiences of their current relationship with their agents. Questions were designed 
according to eleven agency principles namely, contract obligation, capacity, fiduciary 
duty, information asymmetry, risk, communication, conflict of interest, agency cost, 
moral hazard, incentives, adverse selection and cooperation. 
 
The researcher employed the use of Google forms to design an online questionnaire, 
based on the approved questionnaire from the statistical consultation services at the 
University of Johannesburg. Google forms is a part of Google Docs office suite, used 
to create and generate questionnaires and feedback. Using this system, the 
researcher was able to send these questionnaires directly via email to participants. On 
completion of each questionnaire, Google forms graphically evaluated each given 
question and made it possible for the researcher to export the data to Excel, PDF and 
CSV files (Chan, 2015). 
 
The use of paper-based questionnaires requires additional time and effort expended 
to enter the information recorded on paper into a database or data-entry form, whilst 
internet-based questionnaires allow for responses to be entered directly into the 
computer. Whitbourne (2016) agrees that online questionnaires tend to be low cost 
and less time consuming than paper-based questionnaires (Smith, DiClemente, 
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Braithwaite & Blumenthal, 2013).  Internet based-questionnaires can be automated to 
guide respondents as they navigate through the completion of the questionnaire. This 
allows respondents to manage their time of completion and may even assist the 
respondents in completing the questionnaire earlier than predicted, whilst paper-
based questionnaires require for all the relevant details to be highlighted on the same 
page, and may discourage respondents’ participation in the study as they may be 
overwhelmed by the encumbered information. The format of paper-based 
questionnaires lengthens the overall design of the questionnaire, which affects the 
following of the logic of the questions by the respondents (Whitbourne, 2016).  
 
The software embedded in the Google questionnaire that the researcher employed, 
allowed for data to be collected reducing the time and cost of handling data (Bowen, 
Rose and Pilkington, 2017). The online based-questionnaire increased the study’s 
geographical reach, which allowed for a wider reach of an audience from the identified 
sample, ensuring that the study was not limited by location. Respondents were also 
encouraged to participate in the study since the online based-questionnaire allowed 
them to complete the questionnaire at their own time and comfort. Whereby, the 
internet-based questionnaire was programmed to guide respondents as they navigate 
through each question which allows for the saving of time (Whitbourne, 2016). The 
amount of enthusiasm felt by participants to complete a questionnaire can affect how 
much time they are ready to utilise to focus on completing the questionnaire (Cairns 
and Cox, 2008). Using paper-based assessments requires additional time and effort 
for both the respondent and the researcher. The researcher has to expend time trying 
to record the information on the questionnaire into a database or data-entry form and 
using internet-based questionnaires reduces the risk of losing data (Whitbourne, 
2016). 
 
3.4.2 Interviews  
The interview consisted of six open-ended questions. These questions were designed 
to triangulate with questions in the questionnaire. The first three questions of the 
interview correlated with the first section (Section A) of the questionnaire, which 
questioned the athletes and agents about their biographical information, involvement 
in sport, and whether they were involved in an athlete and agent relationship. The last 
three questions of the interview correlated with the second section of the questionnaire 
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(Section B). These questions requested athletes and agents to discuss their 
expectations and experiences of their relationship with each other.  
 
3.4.3 Document analysis 
Document analysis was adopted as a qualitative research method for reviewing or 
evaluating printed and electronic documents that were used. Document analysis 
requires the researcher to examine and interpret data with the aim of eliciting meaning 
and understanding (Bowen, 2009). Two contracts were collected and analysed from 
each sport, namely rugby and football. The researcher aimed to achieve an in-depth 
understanding on how the contracts are structured, as well as to identify common 
themes, with the aim of detecting gaps that speak to the expectations and experiences 
of the athletes. The determinants of capacity, conflict of interest, ethics and 
communication were analysed in each contract considered.  
 
3.5  VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
 
3.5.1 Validity 
A quality research instrument is an instrument that is valid and reliable. A valid 
instrument, measures what it is supposed to measure (Koutoukidis, Stainton & 
Hughson, 2016). Validity is therefore a way to ensure quality in measurement, attest 
expected causalities and allow generalisation (Baumgarten, 2012). 
There are different types of validity, namely construct, content and criterion validity 
that depends on the purpose for which the measuring instrument is used. In this study 
face and content validity of the questionnaire was established utilising experts that 
competent in sport business and research methods in the Department of Sport and 
Movement studies as well as a member from the statistical consultation services at 
the University of Johannesburg, to confirm the validity of the questionnaire. To 
establish the validity of the questions, respondents that are not part of the study were 
asked to indicate the meaning of each question.  
 
3.5.2 Reliability 
The research instruments are reliable if, when repeated under similar conditions and 
with the same subjects, they have similar results (Rayner and Bell, 2016). In this study 
a process of test and retest of the questions was followed, using five randomly selected 
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athletes and agents to completed the interview questions and again five days after the 
first interview, providing test–retest reliability estimates with subjects that did not form 
part of the sample provided feedback during both phases of the process. These test-
retest subjects included; athletes and agents. Test-retest reliability involves 
administering a test to a group of five individuals and retesting them after a suitable 
interval of at least a week. In effect, test-retest reliability can be considered a measure 
of the stability of scores over time (Domino & Domino, 2006). In addition, Cronbach’s 
Alpha was used as a measure for internal consistency of the questionnaire. 
Cronbach’s alpha represents the extent to which variability of individual items 
represents the variability in the overall instrument (Houser, 2012). 
To assess the reliability of the measurement of the agency constructs defined for the 
study, a reliability coefficient, specifically the Cronbach alpha, was computed. 
Cronbach alpha results for each agency concept are presented in Table 3.1.  
The reliability (internal consistency) of the agency elements (or concept) were 
measured using Cronbach alpha. The closer the Cronbach’s alpha is to 1, the higher 
the internal consistency (a form of reliability). To be considered acceptable, Cronbach 
alpha coefficient should be above 0.7. This study utilised the criterion for Cronbach’s 
alpha as follows: (i) excellent (α ≥ 0.9), (ii) good (0.7 ≤ α < 0.9), (iii) acceptable (0.6 ≤ 
α < 0.7), (iv) poor (0.5 ≤ α < 0.6), and (v) unacceptable (α < 0.5) (Sirakaya-Turk et al., 
2017). Results showed in Table 3.1 indicate that all the elements are positively 
contributing to the general reliability. It is important to note that the Cronbach alpha for 
perceptions contract was poor, and had a low loading when it included the first item. 
However, the Cronbach alpha improved to 0.792 when the first item was removed. 
The Cronbach alpha values for all the elements of the agency for athletes’ 
expectations ranged from 0.721 to 0.934. The Cronbach alpha values for all the 
elements of the agency for athletes’ perceptions range from 0.792 to 0.954. 
Competence showed the highest Cronbach alpha, α value at (0.934), while ethics 
showed the lowest α value at (0.721) and the remaining elements which are fairness 
of contract, loyalty, conflict of interest, trust and communication had the following 
Cronbach alpha values respectively, 0.863, 0.853, 0.851, 0.852 and 0.862. For 
perception, trust showed the highest Cronbach alpha, α value at (0.954), while fairness 
of contract shows the lowest α value at (0.691). The remaining elements which are 
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competence, loyalty, conflict of interest, ethics and communication have the following 
Cronbach alpha values respectively, 0.870, 0.915, 0.943, 0.906 and 0.924. 
 
Table 3.1: Reliability coefficient (Cronbach α) for expectation and perception 
dimensions 
 Concepts Cronbach α 
Expectations 
Cronbach α 
Perceptions 
1 Fairness of contract 
• 2 items 
0.863 0.792  
2 Competence 
• 9 items  
0.934 0.870 
3 Loyalty  
• 4 items 
0.853 0.915 
4 Conflict of interest 
• 7 items 
0.851 0.943 
5 Ethics  
• 4 items 
0.721 0.906 
7 Trust 
• 4 items 
0.852 0.954 
8  Communication 
• 4 items  
0.862 0.924 
 
3.6 DATA COLLECTION 
The researcher contacted teams and unions that represent athletes and agents, in the 
two sporting codes namely rugby and football, by letter (See Appendix 5) to seek 
permission to gain access to the athletes for the purpose of this research. The 
feedback received from the unions and associations was via telephonic discussions, 
whereby the associations and unions expressed that they may not give permission on 
behalf of the athletes and their agents. The researcher had to directly seek permission 
from each athlete and agent that participated in the study (See Appendix 7). The 
agents were contacted through telephonic means from the contact lists available on 
the South African Football Association and the South African Rugby Union website, 
for permission to participate in the study.  To collect contracts for document analysis 
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the researcher attained consent from agents and athletes for a copy of their contracts, 
and guaranteed anonymity when publishing the data collected from the contracts. 
 
3.6.1 Questionnaire 
The researcher approached teams in Rugby and Football for permission to conduct 
the study (See Appendix 5). After receiving the permission (See Appendix 6), these 
teams then provided information on the possible participants to the study and a 
questionnaire was sent to these participants by the researcher or these organisations. 
In the case of the questionnaire, a contact list of athletes in rugby and football was 
obtained and contacted by letter to explain the purpose of the research (see Appendix 
4). Following the letter explaining the research, consent forms and information relating 
to the study, were mailed to the participants. Once consent was obtained, a link to the 
online questionnaire (See appendix 1) was sent to the respondent.  
The potential participants to the study were each contacted via email, which directed 
them to the online questionnaire. On other occasions the researcher had the 
opportunity to join teams whilst they were on training camp. During this time the 
athletes would be provided internet access and with the facilitation of the researcher 
they would complete their questionnaires as the researcher explained each question 
to them. The sample participants were identified and contacted to complete the 
questionnaire over a period of 6 months. During this period the researcher had to send 
numerous emails and WhatsApp reminders to the athletes to complete the 
questionnaire.   
 
3.6.2 Contracts  
The data for document analysis, were collected from sample contracts that were 
furnished by agents and athletes after permission was requested and granted by both 
the agents and athletes. During the interviews a non-compulsory request was made 
to the participants, to make their contracts available for document analysis. 
3.6.3 Interviews 
For semi-structured interviews with athletes, the researcher obtained permission to 
contact a list of professional athletes employed as professionals from the offices of the 
CEO’s and Chairpersons after permission was obtained to undertake the research 
(see Appendix 6). These athletes were contacted by telephone. The researcher 
explained the purpose of the research to them. Information on the research (see 
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Appendix 3) was then emailed to the athletes. Consequently, an appointment was 
made with the athlete seeking the time, place and date for the interview. 
A consent form (see Appendix 7) was then sent to the athlete to sign, prior to the 
interview being conducted. Ensuing, the interview with the athlete, information 
regarding the agent representing the athlete would then be requested. The agent 
would then be contacted following the same process of explaining the research to 
them, sending the research information (see Appendix 3), making the appointment 
(securing the time, place and date), obtaining consent (see Appendix 7) and then 
conducting the interview.  
The researcher administered semi-structured interviews which provided a contextual 
understanding of the data collected from the questionnaires. The researcher found 
that most athletes and agents were difficult to contact to arrange a one-on-one 
appointment, therefore phone and skype calls, allowed the researcher to afford these 
participants the opportunity to participate at their convenience.  
The formal semi-structured interviews, were therefore carried out in one of the 
following modes, face-to-face, telephonic or video calls. These options allowed the 
researcher to widen the reach of accessing participants, as well as to reduce the cost 
of conducting all interviews as per the required sample. To record the face-to-face 
interviews, the researcher used at least two recording devices, for both the telephonic 
and video call interviews. 
 
3.7 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
3.7.1 Analysis of quantitative data  
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) is used by various researchers 
for complex statistical analysis and mining of text data (Foley, 2018). In this study 
SPSS was used to compute descriptive data such as percentages, means and 
medians of the responses to the questionnaire. The descriptive statistics gave the 
researcher numerical and graphical summaries of the data collected in a clear, 
manageable and understandable way (Sengar & Sengar, 2015). The clear 
understanding of the data allowed the researcher to comprehensively and adequately 
utilise the data to make informed conclusions.  
Comparative data analysis is an interactive, exploratory, and frequentative process, 
which leads to the detection of exceptional differences between selected groups of 
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data, suggests plausible explanations as well as cause-and effect relationships, whilst 
highlighting paths for further investigations (Zimányi, 2014). The results of these 
comparisons will be discussed in chapters four and five of the study. To assess 
construct validity, factor analysis was conducted and performed to support construct 
validity by examining the characteristics of the factors and concept correspondence of 
each item and paired t-tests were utilised to test significant differences between the 
means of expectations and experiences of athlete-agency agency. 
 
3.7.2 Analysis of qualitative data 
Qualitative data analysis refers to the classification and the interpretation of dialectal 
material to make statements about implicit and explicit dimensions as well as to 
structure the meaning deduced from the collected material. Qualitative data analysis 
can also be applied to determine and define issues in the field or structures and 
processes employed when collecting data (Flick, 2014). The researcher analysed the 
data collected from the semi-structured interviews by transcribing and coding them 
using ATLAS TI. During the coding, emerging themes and concepts related to the 
agency relationship between an agent and athlete were identified and described.  
Player/agent contracts collected from agents formed the core documents to identify 
determinants that constitute agency. These documents were analysed utilising the 
determinants of agency thematically. In order to gain an in-depth understanding of the 
agency relationship between professional athletes and their agents, document 
analysis of contracts between professional athletes and agents in rugby and football 
was conducted. 
Data acquired from document analysis, semi structured interviews and questionnaires 
were tri-angulated to obtain answers towards the research question, aim and 
objectives of the study. The type of triangulation that was adopted is the 
methodological triangulation, which is defined as the use of several methods to explore 
the same issue, in other words strategies or methods are mixed to corroborate one 
against the other (Briggs, Coleman & Morrison, 2014). The use of methodological 
triangulation is a powerful means of cross-checking results in order to offer additional 
support for the validity of the finding (Baker & Egbert, 2016).   
 
 
46 
 
3.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
This study was conducted in accordance with the ethical guidelines outlined by the 
University of Johannesburg (UJ) Code of Practice for Research (www.uj.ac.za). 
Ethical approval of the study was sought from the University of Johannesburg, Faculty 
of Health Sciences Ethics Committee prior to the commencement of data collection 
(See Appendix 8). The ethical clearance number received is REC 241112-035 (See 
Appendix 8). 
The following ethical guidelines were followed during the fieldwork process. The 
researcher requested approval to conduct the research from the clubs that employ 
professional athletes and agents in rugby and football (see Appendix 5). 
Research participants (athletes, agents, members of federations/clubs, members of 
player and agent unions/associations) were identified as indicated in the sampling. All 
participants were provided with full information on the study (see Appendix 3 & 4) 
including the aims and objectives to allow them to make an informed decision in terms 
of their participation. They were informed that their participation was voluntary and that 
they were not obliged nor pressured or forced to participate in the research and that 
they have the right to terminate their participation at any time during the study at no 
consequences. However, withdrawal from participation in the questionnaire will not be 
possible once the participant submits their responses, for their responses will not be 
identifiable as the questionnaires were completed anonymously. Participants were 
also assured of confidentiality of responses through the online questionnaire and the 
possibility to access the results of the study. To ensure that the participants could not 
access the questionnaire more than once, access to the link was restricted to a once 
off access. 
 
In the case of semi-structured interviews, participants were informed that their identity 
will be treated as confidential and will not be disclosed. Similarly, the respondents to 
the questionnaire were assured of their anonymity. Furthermore, the owners of the 
sample of contracts were informed that their identity will not be disclosed. 
Respondents were also informed that the interview will take approximately 30-45 
minutes and the questionnaire 10-15 minutes to complete. 
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The researcher further disclosed that during the interview, respondents could refuse 
to answer some questions which they may feel uncomfortable with, or they could stop 
the interview anytime without any negative consequences. The researcher also 
assured respondents that they will be treated with respect and dignity and that the 
researcher will ensure that there is no form of bias and discrimination against 
participants. Once all the disclosures and forms of information were provided, 
participants were asked to sign a letter of consent (see Appendix 7) indicating their 
understanding of the study and willingness to participate in the study. The researcher 
asked for permission to record interviews from the interviewees and requested them 
to sign a recording consent form (see Appendix 7). 
 
The researcher has securely stored the recordings of interviews and informed consent 
forms at the University of Johannesburg, Department of Sport and Movement Studies 
for three years in a safe locker. 
 
3.9 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter the researcher aimed to provide a basis for the study that was 
conducted by expounding the research design, including the research methods. The 
research design followed, allowed the researcher to successfully conduct a descriptive 
study of the agency relationship between athletes and agents. The researcher adopted 
a mixed-methods approach, whereby a structured questionnaire as an instrument was 
used to collect quantitative data, whilst semi-structured interviews as an instrument 
were used to collect qualitative data. Chapter 4, of this study will focus on the 
presentation of the findings from the data collected. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the researcher reports on the results of the study. These are the 
qualitative and quantitative results which includes a report on the data gathered from 
the questionnaire from athletes (quantitative), document analysis as well as separate 
reports from interviews with athletes and agents (qualitative).  
Results on the questionnaire are presented as follows:  description of the demographic 
profiles of the respondents; frequency and summary statistics for individual questions 
measuring agency-related concepts (both expectations and experiences) as well as, 
factor analysis to derive factors from items. 
 
4.2 ATHLETE’S QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
4.2.1 Demographic information 
A sample of 100 professional athletes completed the questionnaire of which 50 (50%) 
were rugby and 50 (50%) were football athletes. Demographic information required in 
the questionnaire included length of professional career, age group, and level of 
professional participation, agent representation and the duration of their agency 
period. 
The data collected revealed that there was one missing response for this question, 
which means only ninety-nine (99) responses were recorded. Therefore, the largest 
number of respondents have been professional for five (45; 45.5%) and more years 
(Figure 4.1) followed by (35; 35.4%) of respondents who have been professional for 
three to four years and (19; 19.2%) of respondents who have been professional for 
only one to two years.  
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Figure 4.1 Athlete’s years of their professional careers in percentages  
 
The majority (47; 47%) of respondents were from the 20 – 25 years and 26 years and 
older age groups (45; 45%) with the smallest number (8; 8%) of respondents from the 
16 – 19-years age group (Figure 4.2). Athletes with the longest duration of being a 
professional athlete are the oldest athletes in age and those younger in age have 
shorter career durations. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Distribution of respondents per age category  
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The data collected revealed that there was one missing response for this question, 
which means only ninety-nine (99) responses were recorded. The majority of 
respondents (91; 91%) classified themselves as first team athletes, that is defined as 
a player that is regularly selected for the starting eleven in Football or the starting 
fifteen in Rugby (Figure 4.3). A significantly low number of respondents (9; 9%) 
classified themselves as fringe athletes in their respective professions and teams. The 
researcher found that the younger athletes (16 – 19 years age group) rated 
themselves as fringe athletes since they were new and still trying to break into the 
starting line-ups, as opposed to the older athletes that were already forming part of the 
starting line ups.  
 
 
Figure 4.3 Level of professional participation of respondents 
 
At least forty (40;40%) of the respondents indicated that they had a relationship for at 
least one to two years with an agent, whilst a slightly lower number of respondents 
(35; 35%) indicated that their agency relationship has been in place for at least three 
to four years (Figure 4.4). The lowest number of athletes (25; 25%) indicated that their 
agency relationship has been in place for at least five and more years.  The researcher 
found that athletes that formed part of this group (25; 25%) were from the 16 – 19 age 
group, which means that they were young enough to be new in the profession, hence, 
the shorter duration in terms of their relationship with agents. 
91%
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Figure 4.4 Duration of respondents’ athlete-agent relationship in years    
 
4.2.2 Results on athlete-agent agency expectations and experiences 
Table 4.1 illustrates the responses of athletes to questions related to agency. This 
includes responses to both the expectations and experiences of athletes towards their 
agency relationships with their agents. Questions relate to aspects of agency such as 
the contract between the two parties (athlete and agent), competence of the agent, 
loyalty between the agent and player, ethical conduct of both parties, trust and 
communication between the parties. Response options were on a five-point Likert-
type scale where one (1) indicated that the athlete strongly disagrees with the 
statement and five (5) where the athlete strongly agrees and three (3) that served as 
a mid-point/neutral opinion on the scale.  
 
4.2.2.1 Results on athlete agency expectations 
Mean and standard deviation scores for each expectation statement provided in Table 
4.1 on page 55 indicates that athletes have high expectations of their agency with 
agents. The mean value for all the agency expectation statements range between 4 
and 5 which indicate that athletes either agreed or strongly agreed with each of the 
agency expectation statements. These statements were categorised according to 
ranges of mean values: above 4.8; between 4.7 and 4.8; between 4.6 and 4.7; 
between 4.5 and 4.6; and those below 4.5. Only three expectation statements have 
mean values of at least 4.8, of which one fell under ethical conduct of athletes and 
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agents. These statements include: “Excellent agents should always be fair” with a 
mean value of 4.83 and two statements that relate to trust between athletes and 
agents: “Excellent agents should have the full confidence of their athletes to represent 
them” with a mean value of 4.83 as well as “Excellent agents should be 
knowledgeable” with 4.84.  
There are six agency expectation statements with mean values in between the 4.7 
and 4.8 mean value range. This implies that athletes are of the opinion that they 
strongly agreed with these statements. One of the statements relates to conflict of 
interest of the agent: “Excellent agents and their athletes should have common goals, 
beliefs and values” with a mean value of 4.72, with two that relate to trust: “Excellent 
agents should have the trust of their athletes” with 4.77 and “Excellent agents should 
not misrepresent their skills to carry out tasks” with 4.78. The remaining three 
expectation statements also fall under the (4.7 and 4.8) mean value range which 
relates to the communication by agents to athletes: “Excellent agents should 
communicate all information with their athletes” with a mean value of 4.77 and 
“Excellent agents should comply with reasonable instructions given by their athletes” 
with 4.74 as well as “Excellent agents should not enjoy the advantage of hidden 
information” with 4.72. From this it is clear that communication expectation statements 
are rated in the high mean value range of 4.7 to 4.8. Twelve athlete expectation 
statements had a mean value of at least 4.6. The loyalty between athletes and agents 
had all its expectation statements in between the 4.6 and 4.7 mean score range: 
“Excellent agents have the loyalty of their athletes’ with a mean value of 4.69; 
“Excellent agents have the faith of their athletes” with 4.65; “Excellent agents are in 
full cooperation with their athletes” with 4.64 and “Excellent agents are loyal to their 
athletes” with a mean value of 4.63. The competence of agents also had four athlete 
expectation statements in between the 4.6 and 4.7 mean score range. These 
statements include “Excellent agents are licensed by their sport federation” with a 
mean value of 4.69; “Excellent agents negotiate employment contracts for their 
athletes” with 4.69; “Excellent agents have the competency to represent athletes” with 
4.64; and “Excellent agents secure employment contracts for their athletes” with a 
mean value of 4.61. Competence of agents and loyalty between athletes and agents 
fall in the 4.6 and above 4.8 mean value ranges.  
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Six expectation statements below the mean value of 4.5 were identified of which three 
were referring to the competence of agents and agents’ conflict of interest, 
respectively. Those found under the competence of agents included; “Excellent agents 
negotiate as per their athlete’s instructions” with a mean value of 4.54; “Excellent 
agents secure sponsorship deals for their athletes” with 4.53; “Excellent agents secure 
endorsement deals” with 4.53 and “Excellent agents should enjoy the same risk 
attitude as their athletes” with 4.57; “Excellent agents put their athletes interests first 
at all times” with 4.56 and “Excellent agents should not have any conflict of interest 
with their athletes” with a mean value of 4.51. From this it could be concluded that 
agents’ conflict of interest falls in the 4.5 and 4.6 mean value range. 
The lowest mean scores that ranged below 4.5 were found in the contract’s 
agreements, competence of agents, agents’ conflict of interest and ethical conduct of 
athlete’s themes.  The expectation statement for the contract between athletes and 
agents with the lowest mean value of 4.48 read as follows; “Excellent agents require 
fair remuneration from their athletes”. The competence of agents had two expectation 
statements with mean values below 4.5, namely: “Excellent agents manage 
sponsorship deals” with a mean value of 4.46 as well as “Excellent agents manage 
endorsement deals” with 4.49. Agent’s conflict of interest statements also ranged 
below the 4.5 mean value, namely: “Excellent agents always avoid conflict of interest” 
with a mean value of 4.41” and “Excellent agents should not represent athletes who 
have conflicting interests” with 4.34. To conclude, ethical conduct of agents also had 
one of its statements ranging below the 4.5 mean score; “Excellent agents always 
account for payments received” with a mean value of 4.48”.  
Considering the overall mean score results, it can be concluded that athletes have 
high expectations from their relationship with and the services they receive from their 
agents. This makes it important for agents to be aware of these expectations and have 
the right skills to meet the demands of the athlete.  
 
4.2.2.2 Results on athlete agency experiences 
The mean values for all of the athlete agency experience statements fall within the 
ranges of; above 4.5; between 3.8 and 4.5; between 3.7 and 3.8; between 3.6 and 3.7; 
between 3.5 and 3.6; between 3.0 and 3.5; and below 3.0. This implies that athletes 
mostly disagreed, were neutral or somewhat agreed with the experience statements. 
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However, only one experience statement had a mean value of above 4.5. A mean 
value of 4.51 was found in the contract agreement statement that requested athletes 
to indicate whether or not they had an agency contract with their agents. Even though 
most of the experience’s statements received low mean values, at least two of the 
statements have mean values above 3.85 (somewhat agreed), and could be found 
under the agents’ competence and loyalty between athletes and agents’ statements. 
Agents’ competence statement in this range is “My agent has the competency to 
represent me” with a mean value of 3.92. The loyalty statement between athletes and 
agents is “My agent has my loyalty” with a mean value of 3.85. Three athlete 
experience statements obtained mean values above 3.7 (somewhat agreed) range. 
These statements relate to contract agreements, the competence of agents and trust 
between athletes and agent. They read as follows: “I have a fair contract with my 
agent” with a mean value 3.75; “My agent is licensed by our sport federation” with 3.74 
and “My agent is knowledgeable” with 3.71”. Only three athlete agency experience 
statements ranked just above the 3.6 mean value with two of the statements as part 
of the trust between athletes and agents (“I trust my agent” and “I have the full 
confidence in my agent to represent me”) and one of the statements related to the 
agent’s competence (“My agent negotiated my employment contract”). As most of the 
mean values of athletes’ agency experience responses ranged just above the 3.5 
(neutral) mean value, eight of them could be identified. Two of these eight responses 
related to loyalty between athlete and agents (“I have faith in my agent” and “There is 
full cooperation between my agent and I”). One of these eight responses related to the 
agent’s conflict of interest (“My agent and I have common goals, beliefs and values”), 
and three responses related to the ethical conduct of agents (“My agent always 
operates ethically” “My agent is always fair” and “My agent always follows my 
instructions when representing me”). Another one of these eight responses related to 
the trust between athletes and agents (“My agent does not misrepresent their skills to 
carry out tasks”) and the last one of these responses related to the communication 
statements of the statements in the questionnaire (“My agent complies with 
reasonable instructions given by me”). The athlete agency experience statements that 
ranged just below the 3.5 (neutral) mean value relate to one statement that refers to 
the contractual agreement (“My agent requires fair remuneration from me”). Two of 
these statements related to the agent’s competence (“My agent secured my 
employment contract” “My agent negotiates as per my instructions”), one to loyalty 
55 
 
between athletes and agents (“My agent is loyal to me”). Six of these statements 
related to agents’ conflict of interest (“My agent puts my interests first at all times”, “My 
agent always avoids conflict of interest”, “My agent enjoys the same risk attitude as I 
do”, “My agent does not have any conflict of interest with their athletes”. “Excellent 
agents should disclose all the potential conflicts of interest” and “My agent does not 
represent athletes who have conflicting interests”). Only one of these statements 
related to the ethical conduct of agents and three of these statements related to the 
communication between agents and athletes (“My agent always accounts for 
payments received”) and the other three related to the communication between the 
agent and the athlete (“My agent communicates all information with me” “My agent 
always gives prompt disclosures of all facts affecting the agency” “My agent does not 
enjoy the advantage of hidden information”).  
The mean values of the remainder of the athlete agency experience statements in the 
questionnaire ranged below the 3.0 mean value, which implies that the athletes were 
neutral or disagreed with the corresponding athletes’ agency experience statements. 
There are four statements that relate to agents’ competence (“My agent secured my 
sponsorship deals” “My agent manages my sponsorship deals” “My agent secured my 
endorsement deals” and “My agent manages my endorsement deals”). 
The overall experience mean score results, show that a gap exists between the 
athletes’ expectations pertaining to their agents and their actual lived experiences 
when dealing with their agent. This could be as a result of agents not having the right 
skills to deliver satisfactorily or them being unaware of the expectations from athletes.
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Table 4.1: Athlete-Agent agency expectations and experiences 
Expectation and Experiences  Expectations Experiences 
N Mean Std dev N Mean Std dev 
CONTRACTS 
Excellent agents have an agency contract with their athletes: I have an agency 
contract with my agent. 
100 4.65 0.702 100 4.51 1.040 
Excellent agents have fair contracts with athletes: I have a fair contract with my 
agent. 
100 4.53 0.834 100 3.75 1.095 
Excellent agents require fair remuneration from their athletes: My agent requires 
fair remuneration from me. 
100 4.48 0.870 100 3.37 1.220 
Excellent agents have the competency to represent athletes: My agent has the 
competency to represent me. 
100 4.64 0.704 100 3.92 1.070 
COMPETENCE 
Excellent agents are licensed by their sport federation: My agent is licensed by 
our sport federation. 
100 4.69 0.631 100 3.74 1.143 
Excellent agents secure employment contracts for their athletes: My agent 
secured my employment contract. 
100 4.61 0.695 100 3.26 1.488 
Excellent agents negotiate employment contracts for their athletes: My agent 
negotiated my employment contract. 
100 4.69 0.615 100 3.63 1.376 
Excellent agents secure sponsorship deals for their athletes: My agent secured 
my sponsorship deals. 
100 4.53 0.846 99.0 2.22 1.529 
Excellent agents manage sponsorship deals: My agent manages my sponsorship 
deals. 
100 4.46 0.881 100 2.18 1.480 
Excellent agents secure endorsement deals: My agent secured my endorsement 
deals. 
100 4.53 0.870 98.0 2.07 1.401 
Excellent agents manage endorsement deals: My agent manages my 
endorsement deals. 
100 4.49 0.927 99.0 2.09 1.422 
Excellent agents negotiate as per their athlete’s instructions: My agent negotiates 
as per my instructions. 
100 4.54 0.797 100 3.35 1.313 
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LOYALTY 
Excellent agents have the faith of their athletes: I have faith in my agent. 100 4.65 0.730 100 3.58 1.182 
Excellent agents are loyal to their athletes: My agent is loyal to me. 100 4.63 0.825 100 3.44 1.122 
Excellent agents have the loyalty of their athletes: My agent has my loyalty. 99.0 4.69 0.709 100 3.85 1.123 
Excellent agents are in full cooperation with their athletes: There is full 
cooperation between my agent and I. 
100 4.64 0.811 100 3.54 1.176 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
Excellent agents put their athlete’s interests first at all times: My agent puts my 
interests first at all times 
100 4.56 0.820 100 3.42 1.121 
Excellent agents always avoid conflict of interest: My agent always avoids conflict 
of interest. 
100 4.41 0.954 100 3.35 1.132 
Excellent agents and their athletes should have common goals, beliefs and 
values: My agent and I have common goals, beliefs and values. 
100 4.72 0.668 100 3.51 1.168 
Excellent agents should not represent athletes who have conflicting interests: My 
agent does not represent athletes who have conflicting interests. 
100 4.34 1.121 100 3.03 1.243 
Excellent agents should not have any conflict of interest with their athletes: My 
agent does not have any conflict of interest with their athletes. 
100 4.51 0.916 100 3.28 1.092 
Excellent agents should disclose all the potential conflicts of interest with their 
athletes: My agent discloses all the potential conflicts of interest with me. 
100 4.65 0.744 99.0 3.35 1.033 
Excellent agents should enjoy the same risk attitude as their athletes: My agent 
enjoys the same risk attitude as I do. 
100 4.57 0.924 100 3.38 1.126 
ETHICS 
Excellent agents always account for payments received: My agent always 
accounts for payments received. 
100 4.48 1.030 100 3.27 1.188 
Excellent agents always operate ethically: My agent always operates ethically. 100 4.64 0.732 100 3.58 1.121 
Excellent agents should always be fair: My agent is always fair. 100 4.83 0.514 100 3.57 1.057 
Excellent agents always follow their athlete’s instructions when representing 
them: My agent always follows my instructions when representing me. 
100 4.59 0.753 100 3.53 1.123 
TRUST 
Excellent agents should have the trust of their athletes: I trust my agent. 100 4.77 0.510 100 3.64 1.159 
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Excellent agents should have the full confidence of their athletes to represent 
them: I have the full confidence of in my agent to represent me. 
100 4.83 0.451 100 3.64 1.124 
Excellent agents should not misrepresent their skills to carry out tasks: My agent 
does not misrepresent their skills to carry out tasks. 
100 4.78 0.484 100 3.58 1.093 
Excellent agents should be knowledgeable: My agent is knowledgeable. 100 4.84 0.443 100 3.71 1.094 
COMMUNICATION 
Excellent agents should communicate all information with their athletes: My agent 
communicates all information with me. 
100 4.77 0.548 100 3.46 1.158 
Excellent agents should always give prompt disclosures of all facts affecting the 
agency: My agent always gives prompt disclosures of all facts affecting the 
agency. 
100 4.68 0.634 100 3.27 1.136 
Excellent agents should comply with reasonable instructions given by their 
athletes: My agent complies with reasonable instructions given by me. 
100 4.74 0.597 100 3.51 1.124 
Excellent agents should not enjoy the advantage of hidden information: My agent 
does not enjoy the advantage of hidden information. 
100 4.72 0.697 100 3.26 1.236 
Key: n = number of cases; mean = mean for responses; std dev = standard deviation for responses; 
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4.3 FACTOR ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE AGENCY VARIABLES  
Factor analysis is a technique that is used to reduce a large number of variables into 
fewer numbers of factors to conduct a more parsimonious analysis. The technique 
aims to investigate the maximum common variance among the group of variables and 
segregate them into different factors on the basis of their relationship, with each factor 
consisting of those variables which are related among themselves and explain some 
portion of the group variability (Verma, 2015). There are two basic approaches to 
factor analysis, namely; principal component analysis and common factor analysis. 
The principal component analysis is ideally applied when the primary aim of the study 
is to reduce the total number of factors that will account for the maximum variance in 
the data for use in subsequent multivariance analysis, whilst common factor analysis 
estimates factors based only on the common variance. This method is mostly 
appropriate when the primary concern of the study is to identify the underlying 
dimension, and the common variance is of interest. For this study, the researcher used 
the principal component analysis in order to determine the underlying factors relevant 
to the aims of this study.  
Initially there were 35 agency variables representing six agency-related constructs 
namely contracts, competence, loyalty, ethics, trust and communication. The ideal 
required sample size for this number of questions (35) for an exploratory factor 
analysis would be 10x the number of questions which is 350 (Pallant, 2013). Thus, the 
sample size of n=100, was too small to conduct a factor analysis on the full set of 
questions. Instead, constructs were treated as theoretically independent and factor 
analysis was conducted on each construct separately.  Within these constructs, factors 
with an eigenvalue equal to or greater than 1 were chosen for interpretation and only 
variables with factor loading coefficients of 0.50 were considered which meant that 
items with factor loading coefficients of less than 0.45 were excluded.  
 
4.3.1 Keiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy and Bartlett’s Test 
The data provided in the Table 4.2 shows the results for the Keiser-Meyer-Olkin 
measure of sampling and Bartlett’s sphericity test results that were applied to assess 
the suitability of the sample for conducting factor analysis. The items used to measure 
agency concepts correlated appropriately with each other. The Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity demonstrates that the correlation matrix had highly significant correlations 
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at the significance levels of 0.000 for all the concepts, respectively. Having a 
significance level of less than 0.05 indicates that factor analysis is appropriate. The 
Keiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy also proved the results to be 
adequate at levels of 0.552 (contract), 0.763 (competency), 0.843 (loyalty), 0.899 
(conflict of interest), 0.829 (ethics), 0,868 (ethics) and 0,804 for communication (Table 
4.3). These figures are all closer to 1.0, which indicates that factor analysis is 
appropriate with data obtained. 
 
Table 4.2: KMO and Bartlett’s Test results for agency concepts 
Determinants KMO Measure 
of Sampling 
Adequacy 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-
Square 
df Sig. 
Contract 0.552 71.579 3 0.000 
Competency 0.763 777.529 36 0.000 
Loyalty 0.843 279.476 6 0.000 
Conflict of 
Interest 
0.899 636.364 21 0.000 
Ethics 0.829 316.8847 6 0.000 
Trust 0.868 417.977 6 0.000 
Communication 0.804 314.355 6 0.000 
 
4.3.1.1 Factors of athlete-agent agency  
This section will discuss the results of the factor analysis on the factors of agency. 
 
Contract agreement 
Factor analysis of the items/questions making up the contract concept elicited a single 
factor. The statistical analysis also indicated that the majority of the total data 
considered under the contract concept fit into one factor. The total variance 
percentage accumulated in the one factor is 62.5%. This essentially means that this 
factor explains at least 62.5% of the variability of correlation between the items which 
is a suitably high level of explanation.  Rotated component matrix will not apply to this 
concept since only one factor could be found and the factor was not renamed.  
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Agent competence 
The competence concept indicated that the items under this concept could be grouped 
into at least two factors. The total variance percentage explained for these two factors 
is 73.5% and the first factor carries 50.5% of the variation, while the second factor 
carries only 23.0% of the variation.  Due to the extraction of more than one component, 
the solution made it possible for rotation. The table below is the rotated component 
matrix of the factors extracted in the competence concept. 
 
Table 4.3: Rotated component matrix 
Question 
numbers 
Rotated Component Matrix 
 
Component 
Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
52 My agent secured my endorsement deals 0,957 0,144 
51 My agent manages my sponsorship deals 0,944 0,211 
50 My agent secured my sponsorship deals 0,929 0,201 
53 My agent manages my endorsement deals 0,928 0,110 
46 My agent has the competency to represent me 0,080 0,849 
49 My agent negotiated my employment contract 0,015 0,801 
48 My agent secured my employment contract 0,220 0,751 
47 My agent is licensed by our sport federation 0,129 0,678 
54 My agent negotiates as per my instructions 0,338 0,629 
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Table 4.3 demonstrates the results of the rotated component matrix to derive factor 
loadings for each item in relation to the two extracted factors. Each of the values 
indicates the weight and correlation that each item had on each factor. Values that 
were found to be below 0.50 were excluded from each factor. The result indicated a 
factor structure with relatively high factor coefficients on the corresponding factors. 
High factor coefficients indicate correlation of variables with the factors they define. 
After the number of extracted factors was decided, the researcher named factor one; 
Branding, since the items associated to the brand speak to the promotion and 
leveraging of the athlete’s brand. The second factor was named administration, this is 
due to the fact that all the items that link to this factor relate to the agent’s 
administrative skills.  
 
Loyalty between agents and athletes  
The Loyalty concept has only one significant factor. The statistical analysis also 
indicates that the majority of the total data considered under the loyalty concept fit into 
one factor. The total variance percentage accumulated in the one factor is 79.764% 
which essentially means that this factor explains at least 79.764% of the data 
considered under this concept and this is a relatively high fit for the data in the factor. 
Rotated component matrix will not apply to this concept since only one factor could be 
found and the factor was not renamed. 
 
Agents’ conflict of interest  
The conflict of interest concept has only one significant factor. The statistical analysis 
also indicates that the majority of the total data considered under the conflict of interest 
concept fit into one factor. The total variance percentage accumulated in the one factor 
is 75.115% which means that this factor explains at least 75.115% of the data 
considered under this concept. This is a relatively high fit for the data in this factor. 
Rotated component matrix will not apply to this concept since only one factor could be 
found and the factor was not renamed.  
 
Ethical conduct of agents and athletes 
The ethics concept has only one significant factor. The statistical analysis also 
indicates that the majority of the total data considered under the ethics concept fit into 
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one factor. The total variance percentage accumulated in the one factor is 79.060%. 
This means that this factor explains at least 79.060% of the data considered under this 
concept and this is a relatively high fit for the data in the factor. Rotated component 
matrix will not apply to this concept since only one factor could be found and the factor 
was not renamed.  
 
Trust between athletes and agents 
The trust concept has only one significant factor. The statistical analysis also indicates 
that the majority of the total data considered under the trust concept fit into one factor. 
The total variance percentage accumulated in the one factor is 87.857%. This means 
that the factor explains at least 87.857% of the data considered under this concept. 
This is a relatively high fit for the data in the factor. Rotated component matrix will not 
apply to this concept since only one factor could be found and the factor was not 
renamed.  
 
Communication between agents and athletes 
The communication concept has only one significant factor. The statistical analysis 
also indicates that the majority of the total data considered under the contract concept 
fit into one factor. The total variance percentage accumulated in the one factor is 
81.818%. This means that the factor explains at least 81.818% of the data considered 
under this concept. This is a relatively high fit for the data in the factor. Rotated 
component matrix will not apply to this concept since only one factor could be found 
and the factor was not renamed. 
 
4.3.2 Normality test for sample size 
The test for normality was conducted to determine the sample size distribution. The 
study found that most of the tests did not constitute a normal distribution, due to 
athletes inclining to rate their agency expectations high. Ideally a normal distribution 
is preferred but because of the large sample size, another principle, the central limit 
theory was evoked and it allowed for a normal distribution. 
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4.3.3 Factor frequencies analysis 
Table 4.4 Mean and standard deviation for expectation and experiences ratings of 
factors. 
Factor Expect Expect Perc Perc Diff T Df P Effect 
size 
 Mean Std. 
dev 
Mean Std. 
dev 
     
Contract 4,5050 0,79929 3,5600 1,05476 0,945 7,089 99 0,000 0,337 
Competence 
(endorsement/ 
sponsorship) 
4,5025 0,83371 2,1317 1,38809 2,3708 14,252 99 0,000 0,672 
Competence 
(general activities) 
4,6340 0,54832 3,5800 0,97131 1,054 9,385 99 0,000 0,471 
Loyalty 4,6525 0,64147 3,6025 1,02746 1,05 8,865 99 0,000 0,443 
Conflict of interest 4,5371 0,64566 3,3300 0,97984 1,2071 9,671 99 0,000 0,486 
Ethics 4,6350 0,57452 3,4875 0,99200 1,1475 10,009 99 0,000 0,503 
Trust 4,8050 0,39341 3,6425 1,04764 1,1625 10,385 99 0,000 0,521 
Communication 4,7275 0,52235 3,3750 1,05019 1,3525 11,194 99 0,000 0,559 
 
A paired sample t-test was used to determine whether there is a statistically significant 
difference between the athlete’s expectations and experiences of the agency they 
share with their agents. The significance level was set at a=0,05. In the table above 
all the p-values were recorded at P=0,000 for all the agency factors and it was 
concluded that they all recorded statistically significant differences for the gaps 
between expectations and experiences. The Cohen’s Eta squared statistical formula 
was used to determine the effect size. The guiding principle for interpreting the effect 
size is as follows: 0.01 = small effect, 0.06 = moderate effect, 0.14 = large effect 
(Cohen, 1988: 284-7). Given that the Eta squared for the difference between athlete’s 
expectation and experiences mean scores in the table above are higher than 0.14, it 
was concluded that there is a statistically significant difference in the total experiences 
mean score, compared to the total expectations mean score.  
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Table 4.5: Mean and standard deviation for expectations and experiences for 
rugby and football. 
 Football 
 
Rugby 
 
T Df P Effect 
size 
 
 Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev      
Contract 3,8000 0,99488 3,3200 1,06790 2,325 98 0,0
22 
0,052 Moderate 
Competence 
(endorsement/ 
sponsorship) 
1,9333 1,33927 2,3300 1,42091 -1,436 98 0,1
54 
0,021 not 
significant 
Competence 
(general 
activities) 
3,9080 0,86869 3,2520 0,96537 3,572 98 0,0
01 
0,115 moderate 
to large 
Loyalty 3,8550 0,97165 3,3500 1,02892 2,523 98 0,0
13 
0,061 Moderate 
Conflict of 
interest 
3,5029 0,96167 3,1571 0,97672 1,783 98 0,0
78 
0,031 not 
significant 
Ethics 3,7250 0,89962 3,2500 1,03139 2,454 98 0,0
16 
0,058 Moderate 
Trust 3,9900 0,98193 3,2950 1,00343 3,500 98 0,0
01 
0,111 moderate 
to large 
Communication 3,6059 1,06437 3,1450 0,99372 2,234 98 0,0
28 
0,048 Moderate 
 
In the table above a paired sample t-test was used to determine whether there is a 
statistically significant difference between two groups of football and rugby athletes, 
by comparing the expectations and experiences of the agency they each share with 
their agents. The significance level was set at a=0,05. Table 4.5 shows that all the p-
values were recorded at P>0,05. The Eta squared for the difference between athletes’ 
expectation and experiences mean scores, in the table above recorded as follows: 
contract factor = 0.052 which was moderate in effect size, competence factor 1 
(Endorsements/Sponsorships) = 0.021 small effect size, competence factor 2 (general 
activities) = 0.115 moderate to large effect size, loyalty factor = 0.061 moderate effect 
size, conflict of interest factor = 0.031 small effect size, ethics factor = 0.058 moderate 
effect size, trust factor = 0.111 moderate to large effect size, communication factor = 
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0.048 moderate effect size. From these results it can be concluded that compared to 
the other factors, the first competence factor and the conflict of interest factor were not 
statistically significant. Whilst the other factors had a moderate to large effect in terms 
of statistical significance.  
 
4.4 RESULTS OF ATHLETE AND AGENT INTERVIEWS  
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with four agents in rugby, four in football 
(n=8) and four athletes each in rugby and football (n=8).  
 
4.4.1 Results from interviews with athletes 
The researcher identified themes that relate to the agency between athletes and 
agents, from the data collected during interviews. These themes were formed by 
grouping sub-themes that shared commonalities. The first theme titled – the 
relationship between the athlete and the agent, and included the following sub-themes; 
the agent’s regular contact with the athlete, the advice or guidance from agent to 
athlete, transparency between the agent and the athlete, and the responsive support 
from the agent to the athlete.  The second theme titled – agents guarding the benefits 
or advantages of the athlete, includes; agents ensuring that their athletes are always 
dealt the best deals as well as the agent being the custodian of the athlete’s wellbeing. 
The third theme titled – the commerce of the relationship, includes; fees and 
remuneration charged by the agent to the athlete for services delivered. The fourth 
theme, titled - the alliance between the athlete and the agent, includes; the ability for 
the athlete and agent to work as a team, as well as the agent and the athlete 
developing an understanding. The fifth theme, titled - preferential treatments of the 
agent, includes; the agent not having enough time to give to the athlete and having a 
portfolio too big to adequately service. The sixth theme, titled – the agents’ fitness for 
the role, includes; the agents’ ability to source employment for the athlete, manage the 
career of the athlete, through providing financial planning as well as the agent’s fitness 
for the role. 
 
4.4.1.1 Regular contact between the athlete and the agent 
The data from the interviews with athletes revealed that athletes yearn for a good 
relationship with their agents and according to them, regular contact is one of the most 
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essential features of such a relationship with their agents. Athletes indicate that they 
prefer to have an agent that will always make time for them and be available when 
needed. Athletes appreciate an agent that is always available to discuss their post-
match analysis and advise them on both professional and personal matters. The 
following statements were made by athletes during their interviews, regarding regular 
contact:  
“If my agent doesn’t see me often on the field playing, he must call to find 
out if I am ok and make sure that I am “Ok”, if I am doing well emotionally 
or which type of space, I am in…” (Football athlete) 
“My recommendation for the agency between athlete’s and agents if for 
agents to talk more to players that are not playing…” (Football athlete) 
“Agents should regularly communicate with the players to make sure that 
they remain in a good space…” (Football athlete) 
 
4.4.1.2 Transparency 
The athletes also revealed that they expect to share a transparent relationship with 
their agents. They essentially look for agents that are able to guarantee them 
transparency especially when it concerns things that relate to managing their careers. 
At no point must there be information that the agent is aware of, but decides to withhold 
from the athlete. The following statement supports the finding regarding the 
transparency of the agent: 
“I expect my agent to always be transparent with me in terms of 
communicating any information that concerns me…” (Rugby athlete) 
 
4.4.1.3 Advice 
Athletes also revealed that they appreciate having an agent that is able to share advice 
and to advise them on both professional and personal matters. The relationship with 
the agent is critical to the success of the athlete’s career. Therefore, athletes require 
a confidant that would be able to provide them with counsel on professional matters, 
such as post-match analysis, support with career challenges as well as someone that 
can provide counselling on personal matters. As noted in the statements below: 
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“I am happy with my agent because he gives post-match analysis and 
advice on how I could improve my game” (Rugby athlete). 
 
4.4.1.4 Responsive support 
Athletes place great value on their relationship with their agents and prefer an agent 
that is responsive to their needs. Fundamentally, athletes prefer to have an agent that 
is present and effectively responsive to their career requirements and challenges.  This 
is revealed in the following statements: 
“…he must know if all is well at training or do, I have anything in mind to 
share with him, and if needs be, he must be willing to engage the club about 
my situation.” (Football athlete) 
“…agents to talk more to players that are not playing, than those that are 
playing. Because if players that are playing regularly are in a good space as 
compared to those that don’t…” (Football athlete) 
 
4.4.1.5 Athletes’ best interests  
The interviews made it evident that athletes prefer to go into a contract agreement with 
an agent that they can trust with safeguarding their livelihood. They want to deal with 
agents that will always protect their best interests, when deciding or concluding a 
contract with a team and even when negotiating remuneration packages. Athletes 
therefore require an agent that always aims to achieve outcomes that are in the best 
interests of the athletes. Examples of what some of the athletes had to say on this 
issue are provided below. 
“Where-ever I go to, my agent must always ensure that he finds out as much 
as possible about the club and see if the move is suitable and for my best 
interest.” (Football athlete) 
“…my agent always puts my best interests first…” (Football athlete) 
“If I am not playing my agent must be prepared to engage the club about 
why am I not playing, since I belong on the field as a player.” (Football 
athlete) 
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4.4.1.6 Agent fees 
One of the challenges that athletes face in their relationships with agents are the fees 
charged by their agents. Agents normally charge athletes a percentage fee for various 
services and sometimes even if the agent was not directly involved in the acquiring of 
a service, they still charge the athlete a percentage of the money due to them. 
According to athletes, high agent fees are a challenge in the relationship with agents: 
“The one challenge I have with my agent is the percentage fee he charges 
for the services he renders; I sometimes feel that it is a lot…” (Football 
athlete) 
 
4.4.1.7 Remuneration 
According to the data collected during the interviews with athletes it was revealed that 
the high agent fees charged by the agent sometimes create saving challenges for the 
athlete. Athletes feel that the high fees do not allow them to adequately put away 
money for their retirement.  
“My agents should charge reasonable fees, to allow me to have enough 
money to save for retirement.” (Rugby athlete) 
 
4.4.1.8 Team-work/cohesion 
During the interview’s athletes agreed that it is important for them to have great 
working relationships with their agents. Athletes want a relationship with agents that 
allows for cohesion between them in terms of the aim and objectives of the athlete’s 
career. Having this cohesion will allow for unity and consistency in their relationship, 
as noted below: 
“Since I started my career, I’ve had only one agent because of how well we 
work together…” (Rugby athlete) 
 
4.4.1.9 Common understanding  
Because of the importance of the relationship with the agent, in the athlete’s career, 
interview results show that athletes prefer to develop an understanding with their 
agents from the beginning of the relationship. There are numerous benefits in an 
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athlete and agent relationship when a common understanding exists in terms of what 
the relationship can achieve. The following statement supports this finding:   
“My agent sat me down and made me understand that players between the 
age of 18-25 should priorities game time over money when deciding on a 
move/team doesn’t matter which team. From 25 to 30 players should then 
priorities both money and game time, but post 30 to retirement players must 
priorities money to contribute to their retirement. This has made it easy for 
my agent and I to understanding each other when he manages my career” 
(Football athlete) 
 
4.4.1.10 Bias against the athletes 
Interviews revealed that one of the challenges that athletes face in their relationship 
with agents is being managed by an agent that manages many other similar athletes. 
This situation creates conditions for the athlete to not receive sufficient attention from 
the agent. Such circumstances also tend to put the agent in a position whereby they 
choose to dedicate their time and best services to the athletes that bring in the most 
money as compared to those that are not doing so well. Another condition that leads 
to the bias against the athletes between an athlete and an agent is the fact that most 
agents are over committed, in the sense that their player portfolios are sometimes too 
large to sufficiently manage every single athlete in their stable. The following 
statements support this finding: 
“… sometimes agents deal with a lot of players, so I try to not be a cry baby 
all the time and expect him to focus on me since he has other clients. So, 
he needs to share his attention amongst us, because sometimes you feel 
like he is not giving you enough attention but also you have to understand 
agents deal with many players that need the same attention as you, that 
makes it very difficult.” (Football athlete) 
“When I phone him his mostly unavailable because he has many players 
that he has to split his attention with.” (Rugby athlete) 
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4.4.1.11 Agent’s prowess  
According to the answers from the interviews, athletes expect to work with agents that 
possess the skill to source employment for them, manage their careers and secure 
sponsorships as well as endorsements. With regard to employment sourcing, athletes 
prefer to go into a relationship with agents that have the skill to help them find a 
suitable team and better contracts. With regard to career management, athletes prefer 
to work with agents that have the requisite knowledge in terms of how they should 
successfully manage their career both on the field and off the field in preparation for 
post-retirement. With regard to financial planning, athletes also indicated their 
preference for an agent that is able to assist them with managing their finances. 
Another skill that is fundamental to the work of an agent, is their ability to source 
sponsorship and endorsements for their athletes. The following statements revealed 
what was said in the interviews pertaining to the agent’s skills: 
“I expect my agent to secure me a better contract, buy me football boots 
and give me financial advice.” (Football athlete) 
 “Yes. To always get me better deals (move), find possibilities of better 
opportunities, to make sure that he advises me about my career moves…” 
(Rugby athlete) 
 “My agent should make sure I get endorsement deals.” (Football athlete) 
 
4.4.2 Results from interviews with Agents 
Using the data collected from interviews with agents, the researcher aimed to identify 
themes that related to the relationship between athletes and agents.   
 
4.4.2.1 Regular contact between the agent and the athlete 
During the interview’s, agents highlighted the importance of having regular contact 
with their athletes and consistently making time for them to develop an understanding 
between them as well as to enforce an open-door policy. This approach allows athletes 
to feel that they can approach the agent at any time and about anything. In summary, 
according to agents, the need for regular calls and meet-ups with their athletes is 
important to their relationship. The following statements support this finding: 
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“The core basics for my business include communication…” (Football 
intermediary) 
 “…you must have good communication with your players constantly and 
you must be there for them, stay in touch, and remember their birthdays to 
show that you care.” (Football intermediary) 
 “I have at least 3 to 4 coffee sessions with my players every season and 
lots of calls to check up on them…” (Rugby agent) 
 
4.4.2.2 Agents’ responsive support 
In the statement below the agent expressed the importance of being present, 
consistently available and responsive to the needs of their athletes. Agents recognise 
that their role goes beyond the administrative duties of negotiating a contract for the 
athletes, but that they need to be there consistently for their athletes to provide support 
on matters even beyond the athlete’s career. Therefore, it is a need for the agent to 
always be the go-to person for the athlete. The statement below expresses this need: 
“I help my players with things over and above football but general welfare 
matters in life too, I become a go to person in life not only for football matters 
but also for other things. These allows me to make the relationship better 
and to strengthen the relationship.” (Football intermediary) 
 
4.4.2.3 Transparency 
As much as there is an expectation of agents to be transparent in their dealings with 
athletes, they also have the same expectation of athletes. According to agents their 
ideal agent and athlete relationship is characterised by transparency between the 
agent and the athlete. If the athlete is approached by a club, a sponsor or even another 
agent, there is an expectation for the athlete to make their agent aware of these 
approaches. As noted in the statement below:  
“…because we may not be able to work together in the future when I have 
a better deal for you. So, I expect transparency…” (Rugby agent) 
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4.4.2.4 Trust between the athlete and the agent 
The data collected during the interviews reveal that agents consider the trust between 
themselves and their athletes as an important ingredient for a great relationship. If 
there is low trust between the agent and the athlete, that could lead to huge challenges 
between the two parties, which would inevitably lead to the relationship collapsing or 
a failure to meet or achieve set goals.   
“It is important for me to have the trust of my players…” (Rugby agent). 
 
“One of the challenges I have in the relationship with some of my players is 
low trust.” (Football agent) 
. 
“If any of my athletes and another agent speak, they should not leave or go 
behind closed doors. When you trust someone to manage you, you must be 
honest enough to say I think I’ve reached my growth point with you and I 
have found someone else to manage me. When my contract ends, I am 
going to look for another agent.” (Football intermediary) 
 
4.4.2.5 Athletes’ best interests  
According to the data collected, agents agree that they should at all times aim to serve 
and protect the interests of their athletes. This belief allows agents to not deviate from 
their primary function of acting as the prime guardian of the athlete’s interests. As 
stated below: 
“I value my players and I always put their best interests first...” (Rugby 
agent). 
“As an agent I must always keep my promises, by doing what I said I will do 
and players must always do what they are supposed to do…” (Rugby agent) 
“I feel at every given time agents need to behave in a professional manner 
looking after the interests of their clients, and this is not a job that people 
must do just for the sake of money, I think there is more than just the money 
when managing players.” (Football agent) 
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4.4.2.6 Loyalty and honesty (ethical conduct of agent and athlete) 
The interviews with agents reveal that the agents acknowledge that it is important for 
them to have a relationship with the athlete and that both parties have confidence in 
each other. Athletes should have confidence that agents know what they are doing 
and will deliver while the agent should have the same confidence in the athlete. This 
fact is supported by these statements: 
“Most important expectation for me as an intermediary is to always look for 
loyalty and honesty. I expect my players to be loyal and honest and at the 
same time I also expect myself to be loyal and honest to them.” (Football 
intermediary). 
“I come across to my players as honest, dependable, and credible and not 
after I can’t always expect them to be loyal and honest, I also expect myself 
to be loyal and honest. I come across to them as honest, dependable, and 
credible and not after their money, I help them with things over and above 
football but general welfare matters in life too, I become a go to person in 
life not only for football matters but also for other things. These allows me 
to make the relationship better and to strengthen the relationship.” (Football 
intermediary) 
“So sometimes I feel there is a bit of a gap when it comes to agents where 
they turned to do things that do not put the profession in a good light where 
the industry can give the role the respect it deserves because of a few 
shoddy dealings. That’s one of the reasons you would find players with more 
than one intermediary in a short space of time…” (Football intermediary) 
“I have players that signed contracts with clubs in secret…” (Football 
intermediary) 
 
4.4.2.7 Alliance between the athlete and agent 
The interviews with agents revealed that there’s an agreement with what athlete’s 
stated about the alliance between the agent and the athlete. Agents also state that 
they value having a common understanding with their athlete. It is import for the agent 
and the athlete to have an understanding about each other’s expectations and those 
expectations must be realistic or within the capacity of the relationship. This is 
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important as cohesion in the relationship can only be attained when both the athlete 
and the agent have a mutual understanding. Without this common understanding 
frustrations may arise in the relationship. The following statement is in support of this 
finding: 
“It is important for me to know my players well, to understand them, so that 
I can carry on managing them well. So, regular communication is important.” 
(Rugby agent) 
“Athletes particularly in our industry in football, they are very impatient, they 
want things to happen as soon as they think it’s possible. They expect you 
to sometimes work magic and they feel you are the answer to their 
problems. But some appreciate it if you explain things to them and you are 
real with them and sometimes, they end up walking away and end [up] 
signing with another agent that has promised them heaven on earth…” 
(Football intermediary) 
“I don’t know about other managers but players are people that want things 
to happen now…” (Football intermediary) 
“Some of the challenges involve players coming with high expectations that 
are mostly superficial expectations…” (Football intermediary) 
“Players sometimes have unrealistic expectations and must be managed 
strictly, not managing these expectations may lead to players finding 
another agent…” (Rugby agent) 
 
4.4.2.8 Athlete dedication and commitment  
When agents were asked about some of their agency expectations, they mentioned 
that they expect athletes to remain committed and dedicated to their profession. 
Agents find it easier to deal with athletes that are committed to their profession and 
clubs also prefer to offer contracts to athletes that have high levels of commitment and 
dedication. Below are some of their statements emphasising this point: 
 “I look for players that can look after themselves and remain dedicated to 
their profession. Those type of players they make it easy to work with…” 
(Rugby agent). 
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 “I expect players to do their part on the field, live a healthy responsible 
lifestyle and no misbehaving. They should aim to live clean lifestyles…” 
(Football intermediary).  
 
4.4.2.9 External influences on the athlete 
Agents stated that one of the challenges they face in their relationship with athletes is 
the external influences that sometimes come between the athlete and the agent. 
These external influences come in the form of the athlete’s parents, partners, fans and 
other agents. Such influences often pose a threat for the success of the relationship.  
This finding was supported by the following statements: 
“It is important for players to not allow any interference in their agency with 
agents from anyone, girlfriends, parents, uncles etc.” (Rugby agent) 
“Agents amongst themselves they need to be honest and respect other 
agents and stop undermining contracts that exist with players and other 
agents which causes lots of problems amongst themselves…” (Football 
intermediary).  
“Players talk to other agents and sign contracts in secret…” (Football 
intermediary) 
 
4.4.2.10 Agent’s prowess  
According to the information obtained during the interviews, agents agreed that it is 
important for them to have the skills to holistically manage their athletes’ careers. This 
includes sourcing and negotiating employment contracts, securing sponsorship and 
endorsement deals for the athlete. If agents fail to deliver on these core services, they 
run the risk of losing their athletes to other agents in the market. These statements 
support this finding: 
 “I've got what I call an athlete management philosophy that I use for every 
client and parent that I sign. Basically, it speaks to the different aspects of 
what management should be about when talking about athlete 
management. Managing an athlete is not about brokering a deal, it is about 
managing the athlete and letting them focus on the trade. For instance, it’s 
about what are you doing in regards to education, what are you doing in 
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regards to legal issues, what are you doing in regards to image rights, what 
are you doing in regards to financial planning, what are you doing in regards 
to investments, what are you doing in regards to wellness. Basically, I 
communicate that with them about putting emphasis on their holistic 
management.” (Football intermediary) 
 “The biggest challenge is finding sponsors and endorsements for my 
players…” (Rugby agent) 
 “You need to keep delivering as an agent cause someone else will, so you 
need to constantly find sponsorship and free stuff to give to players.” (Rugby 
agent) 
 
4.4.2.11 Deception from the agents 
During the interviews it was evident that in the player-agent agency relationship there 
are instances whereby, either one of the parties may fall into the trap of misleading the 
other party. As noted in these statements: 
“… some agents mostly over promise and under deliver…” (Rugby agent) 
 
4.4.2.12 Agent’s remuneration 
During the interviews some of the agents were bold enough to admit that one of their 
main objectives from their relationship with athletes is to make a profit. Agents are 
running a business of providing services to the agent and for their business to be 
successful, their relationship with the athletes needs to be profitable. However, 
because of the risks involved in managing an athlete, profit is not always guaranteed 
as noted blow: 
 “One of my expectations when I manage a player is to be profitable…” 
(Rugby agent) 
“I don’t know about other managers but players are people that want things 
to happen now. When I talk about dishonesty, I can tell you I've lost 3 
professional players to different agents due to dishonesty. One was even 
overseas a season ago. That’s why I say this thing I do it because I love it. 
I don’t make money from it…” (Football intermediary) 
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4.4.3 Results from document analysis 
Contracts for data collection were requested from six (n=6) agents and athletes, three 
in rugby and three from football. All six contracts were provided as sample contracts 
and none of them belonged to, nor were signed by, any of the parties. 
The researcher investigated the contracts to identify whether they contained any 
aspects/clauses related to agency. The results from the document analysis were 
categorised into themes, which will be discussed below. 
4.4.3.1 Athlete and agent agreement 
In all the contracts collected there were clauses that address the appointment of the 
agent by the athlete. These clauses state the extent of the agent’s appointment, in 
terms of what the agent is expected to do for the athlete. Some of the clauses to 
support this finding read as follows:  
 “The Player hereby appoints the Agent as his exclusive representative for 
the period set out hereunder to represent him for all purposes under this 
Agreement. The Agent shall represent the Player worldwide or as otherwise 
agreed hereunder (list countries)” (Rugby athlete-agent contract). 
 “The parties agree that this contract grants the players' agent a general 
exclusive right to represent the player during the period covered by the 
contract.” (Football athlete-agent contract) 
 
4.4.3.2 Agent’s prowess  
Data analysis revealed that contracts governing the relationship between agents and 
athletes have clauses that recognise and enforce the need for agents to provide 
particular services, such as the sourcing of employment, sponsorship and 
endorsement deals for the athlete. The clauses below were identified during document 
analysis: 
“The Agent agrees to: represent the Player and provide advice, counsel and 
assistance to the Player with respect to  
• procuring and negotiating a Player Contract for the Player; 
• both the Player and the Province’s obligations under the Player Contract; 
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• procuring and negotiating marketing and promotional opportunities, public 
speaking engagements and other endorsement arrangement when 
applicable.” (Rugby athlete-agent contract) 
 
4.4.3.3 The Athlete’s best interest 
The importance of the need for agents that aim to serve the best interests of the athlete 
at all times are emphasised through clauses that enforce this responsibility.  
“During the contract period the agent is obliged to safeguard the interests of 
the player in a professional and conscientious manner,” (Rugby athlete-
agent contract.) 
“The player is obligated to give the agent the information necessary to allow 
him or her to safeguard the player's interests in a professional and 
conscientious manner.” (Football athlete-agent contract) 
  
4.4.3.4 Transparency 
Document analysis catered for the need for transparency through clauses that enforce 
transparency in the relationship around all the possible outcomes or situations the 
athlete and the agent may find themselves involved in, such as any issues of 
significance to the athlete.  
“During the contract period the agent is obliged to:   
• not bind the player economically or in some other manner without his or 
her permission,   
• keep the player informed about all issues of significance for him or her,   
• neither directly nor indirectly pay or receive any type of benefit to/from 
clubs or others that violate the Players' Agents Regulations.” (Football 
athlete-agent contract) 
 
 “The agent agrees to disclose all material facts to the Player on his request 
which relate to the subject of an individual Player’s contract negotiations.” 
(Rugby athlete-agent contract) 
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“The agent agrees to keep the player informed about all issues of 
significance for him or her and not bind the player economically or in some 
other manner without his or her permission.” (Football athlete-agent 
contract) 
 
“The agent agrees to disclose the details of any arrangement the Agent has 
to receive fees, commissions, money or any other benefit from a third party 
in relation to services provided to the Player or for recommendation, 
endorsement or referral of the third party to the Player by the Agent” (Rugby 
athlete-agent contract). 
“By signing this contract, the player confirms that he or she is not bound by 
any other corresponding agreement. During the contract period the player 
is obliged to: 
• inform the agent of negotiations with clubs outside the scope defined,   
• inform the agent of all inquiries and offers from other agents, clubs and 
others that directly or indirectly act on behalf of a club,   
• give the agent the information necessary to allow him or her to safeguard 
the player's interests in a professional and conscientious manner.” (Football 
athlete-agent contract).”  
 
4.4.3.5 Industry regulations 
Agents are governed by certain laws and regulations of the specific sport association 
or federation, in which they operate. They have to abide and adhere to the rules and 
regulations as well as to ensure that the athletes they manage also abide and adhere 
to this legislation. 
“During the contract period the agent is obliged to:   
• ensure that he or she and his or her employees act in accordance with 
applicable requirements stipulated by the national association and FIFA,   
• maintain the license and insurance according to the Players' Agents 
Regulations, and… “(Football athlete-agent contract).  
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4.4.3.6 Obligations of the athlete 
Athletes also have obligations to the agent. Some of these obligations include the 
restriction on athletes to enter into any agreements or contracts conflicting with their 
agreement with the agent. The agent is also protected from the risk of being liable for 
some of the actions of the athlete performed outside their relationship. This allows the 
agent to have fortification against athletes that may not behave fairly towards the 
agent. Below are some of the identified clauses:  
“By signing this contract, the player confirms that he or she is not bound by 
any other corresponding agreement. During the contract period the player 
is obliged to:  
• not enter into contracts that may come into conflict with this contract,  
• act in accordance with applicable requirements stipulated by the national 
association or FIFA, and… (Football athlete-agent contract). 
 
4.4.3.7 Agent fees 
One of the consistent features in the relationship between the agent and the athlete, 
are the fees charged by the agent. Contracts stipulate and govern the implementation 
of the charging of these fees. This allows both parties to agree upfront about the 
percentage fee to be charged, when the fee is applicable, the duration of the fee 
payable and for which services the fee should be paid. The clauses below support this 
theme: 
“The Player agrees to pay the following fees to the Agent during the term 
being a sum of money equal to – 
[…] percentage of the Player salary amount paid to and received by the 
Player pursuant to his Player Contract per annum provided the Agent has 
negotiated such Player Contract; 
[…] percentage of the total fees paid to and received by the Player for 
speaking engagements arranged by the Agent; 
[…] percentage of the total fees paid to and received by the Player for 
marketing and promotional opportunities arranged by the Agent; and 
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[…] percentage of the total fees paid to and received by the Player for 
personal endorsements arranged by the Agent” (Rugby athlete-agent 
contract). 
 
4.4.3.8 Remuneration 
The remuneration of the agent and the athlete is central to the management 
relationship between the two parties. Athletes search for clubs that will offer them 
remuneration for their services on the field while agents manage the athlete for an 
agent’s fee to generate profit for their business. Clauses that cater for the 
remuneration of the club, generally cater for the remuneration of the agent too. An 
example of such a clause is provided below: 
“The parties agree that the player shall pay the following fee on the basis of 
an invoice from the agent for work the agent has performed under this 
contract:  
[…] % of the gross annual salary or    
[…] as a lump sum when the player contract enters into force or  
[…] allocated over the contract period with equal instalments at the end of 
each year. (Rugby player-agent contract) 
After the negotiations regarding a transfer or the player's personal contract 
have been finalised, the player may issue a written authorisation stating that 
the club pay the player's agent. The authorisation must state what is agreed 
between the player and agent in the representation contract.” (Football 
athlete-agent contract) 
 
4.4.3.9 Interaction and communication 
The contract between the agent and the athlete provides guidance on how the parties 
should interact with each other. Over and above the informal interaction between the 
agent and the athlete, formal issues such as legal agreements should be recorded 
using formal ways of communicating. Using formal techniques of interacting such as 
writing a letter, e-mailing or using facsimile allows for record keeping and lessens any 
chances of misunderstanding between the agent and the athlete. Note the clause 
below: 
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“All notices required or permitted to be given by one (1) Party to another 
under this Agreement must be in writing, addressed to the other Party and 
delivered to that Party’s address; or transmitted by facsimile transmission to 
that Party’s address; or e-mailed to that Party’s e-mail address” (Rugby 
athlete-agent contract). 
 
4.4.3.10 Remedial options 
The document analysis revealed that the contracts recognise and cater for the risks 
involved in the relationship between the agent and the athlete. Therefore, clauses 
providing guidance in the relationship for situations whereby any of these risks occur 
were identified in the contracts analysed. Some of those high-risk situations include 
any of the parties claiming damages against the other, protection from unwarranted 
expenses, dispute resolution, as well the adherence to legislation governing the 
relationship or the sport. Below are some examples of these clauses: 
“The player may claim damages from the agent if termination of the contract 
has resulted in significant losses or nuisance.” (Football athlete-agent 
contract.) 
“Except as otherwise set out in this Agreement or approved in advance by 
the Player in writing, all expenses incurred by the Agent in the performance 
of this Agreement shall be solely the Agent’s responsibility and shall not be 
reimbursable by the Player unless otherwise agreed by the Player.” (Rugby 
athlete-agent contract). 
“In the event of any dispute arising between the parties to this Agreement, 
whether with respect to the meaning of the terms of the Agreement, the 
nature and effect of the obligations imposed or as a result of its termination 
pursuant to clause 8 or otherwise, a party must refer that dispute to SARU 
to be dealt with in accordance with clause 4.10 of the SARU Player Agent 
Regulations.”(Rugby athlete-agent contract) 
“By signing this contract, the parties agree to submit all disputes regarding 
the validity or understanding of this contract to the PSL/SAFA Arbitration 
Scheme. The same applies to other disputes between the contractual 
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parties resulting from this contract or annexes thereto.” (Football athlete-
agent contract) 
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
The athlete’s questionnaire indicated high mean values for athletes’ agency 
expectations as well as low mean values for athlete’s experiences. It was clear that 
athletes had high expectations for the services they receive from their agents. 
However, they rated the actual service they receive from their agents lower than their 
expectations. Factor analysis identified at least one factor for each of the agency 
determinants, except for the competence determinant. The competence determinant 
computed two factors, namely the administrative and branding skills of the agent. 
Factor analysis showed a statistically significant difference in the total experiences 
mean score, compared to the total expectations mean score. This means that the 
athletes are not happy with the experiences they encounter in their relationship with 
agents, with their experiences falling short of their expectations. 
Interviews and the document analysis identified important agency relationship themes 
including; regular contact; transparency; advice; responsive support; athlete’s best 
interests; agent fees; trust; loyalty and honesty; remuneration; alliance; cohesion; 
common understanding; bias against the athletes; agent’s prowess; dedication and 
commitment; external influences; deception; agreement; industry regulations; 
obligations; manner of interacting and remedies.  
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 4 data was presented from athletes’ responses to a questionnaire on their 
expectations of and experiences with agency. This was followed by a discussion of 
the themes derived from interviews with athletes and agents on their perception on 
what constitutes the agency relationship between an athlete and agent. Lastly, themes 
were discussed that derived from contracts between agents and athletes. In this 
chapter the discussion and synthesis of these results within the context of related 
literature will be undertaken to discuss a framework for agency in sport in South Africa. 
 
5.2 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
In order to gain an understanding on what constitutes agency between an athlete and 
agent the results in the previous chapter will be discussed and interpreted as 
determinants of agency between an athlete and agent within the context of the agency 
theory, as well as other existing contextual literature.  
 
5.2.1 Determinants of athlete-agent agency 
An agency relationship arises between two parties when one, designated as the agent, 
acts for, on behalf of, or as a representative for the other, designated by the principal 
(Foss, 2000). For the purpose of this study the determinants of the agency relationship 
between the athlete (principal) and the agent, namely; the contractual relationship, 
communication, fiduciary relationship, mentoring, cooperation, information 
asymmetry, three-way relationship and the contextual relationship will be discussed. 
 
5.2.1.1 Context 
The relationship between the athlete and the agent takes place within a particular 
context. Agency is always contextual and Lue (2010) agrees that everything in 
relationships is contextual. The context in which the relationship is taking place will 
change from sport to sport. The rugby context could be different to the football context. 
The athlete-agent relationship exists in a context of the type of sport, relations, 
purpose, time, setting and requirements. The contextual relationship between the 
athlete and the agent in the different sport may differ. In football, the International 
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Federation of Football Associations recognises intermediaries and not agents, as 
compared to rugby. The athlete-agent relationship is not permanent and may exist 
between shorter and longer periods of time. A contextual relationship is similar to a 
support system (Kozick, 2015) and in the context of this study athletes have agents 
providing them with a support system. Therefore, this framework underlines the 
importance of taking contextual determinants into consideration when evaluating the 
athlete-agent agency. 
 
5.2.1.2 Athlete 
The athlete is seen as the principal in the athlete-agent relationship. One of the key 
findings of this study is the need for athletes to have the talent and development 
potential necessary to succeed as professionals. Talent is the innate capacity that 
enables an individual to display exceptionally high performance in a domain that 
requires special skills and training (Aggerholm, 2015). This implies that sport 
organisations participating on a professional level in sport will not contract non-skilled 
athletes or athletes with no potential to develop into highly sought-after athletes. For 
this reason, agents’ contract with athletes with the talent and development potential 
as they could negotiate agreements with sport organisations concerning these 
athletes. Therefore, the athlete-agent relationship requires the athlete to have sporting 
talent and development potential. 
 
5.2.1.3 Agent 
The athlete-agent relationship requires agents to have the competence to deliver on 
the tasks assigned by the athlete. Results from the questionnaire and interviews 
indicate that athletes prefer to commit to agency agreements with agents that possess 
the requisite knowledge and skills to take care of the duties assigned to them. It further 
showed that athletes expect agents to have the required competencies to represent 
them, secure and negotiate employment contracts, as well as securing and managing 
sponsorship and endorsement deals. However, athletes’ experience of agent 
competencies showed that agents do not necessarily deliver on this expectation. This 
could be as a result of agents not possessing the required competencies to deliver on 
these expectations. On the other hand, the failure of agents to deliver on expectations, 
could be affected by athlete’s lack of talent or development potential, necessary to 
enable negotiations with sport organisations and branding of the athlete by the agent. 
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This finding is strengthened by Armstrong (2019) who stated that brands need athletes 
just as much as athletes need brands and that when working together by the magic of 
sport endorsement deals, both can make lucrative returns. 
 
The athlete-agent contract analysis also showed that provision is made in contracts to 
cater for the protection and enforcement of duties by the agent (using their skill and 
knowledge) to the benefit of athletes. In addition, the factor analysis identified two 
factors that relate to competence of agents namely general administrative competence 
and the agent’s ability manage help the athlete develop as a brand and to secure 
sponsorships and endorsements for the athlete. These two factors standout as the 
most important because they speak to the two most important services that athletes 
expect from an agent and that is the ability to negotiate contract and the ability to 
secure employment and endorsement opportunities. This finding is supported by 
Butler (1999) who agrees that agents are hired to perform certain tasks with the explicit 
and implicit contract that they will use their agency to devote the appropriate energy 
and competence to the assigned tasks. 
 
5.2.1.4 Contractual relationship 
Agency between the athlete and the agent includes two types of contracts, namely the 
athlete-agent contract and the athletes’ contracts with the sport organisation. The 
athlete-agent contract is central to the athlete-agent relationship and may be in writing 
or verbal. Sharp, Moorman, & Claussen (2014) agrees that an agency relationship can 
be established by informal oral agreements or by more formal written agreements. The 
athlete-sport organisation contract is negotiated by agents with the sporting 
organisation on behalf of the athlete. In rugby the International Rugby Board (IRB) 
requires agents to be licensed by unions, and for a contract to be signed between the 
athlete and the agent. However, in football, the International Federation of Football 
Associations (FIFA) discontinued the recognition of agents, allowing athletes to be 
managed by intermediaries, which may be anyone that athletes choose to represent 
them. All athletes in the study have agents or intermediaries representing them, except 
for one that recognises their representative as an intermediary. Nevertheless, all 
athletes and agents have agreements between them. This finding is consistent with 
how Hulbert (2019), defines the agency agreement as being executed by a person, 
referred to as the agent, who is authorised to act for or on behalf of another.  
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The expectation mean for athletes having fair contracts or being charged fair 
remuneration/agent fees by their agents was high, but measured very low for their 
experiences. This means that athletes do not necessarily agree that their contract with 
their agents were free, nor did they believe that their agents charged them fair 
remuneration/agent fees. During the interview’s athletes were of the opinion that the 
percentage fees that agents charge are too high. Athletes and agents agree on these 
fees when going into the agency agreement, and these fees are stipulated in their 
agency contracts. However, these percentage fees are governed by the sport 
federations, to protect the athlete from unscrupulous agents. Agents may not retain a 
profit from any transaction, other than proper agents’ fees, unless the athlete gives 
fully informed consent (Edwards, 2007). Athletes and agents also recognised 
remuneration as an integral part of the athlete-agent relationship, since athletes 
remunerate agents for their services. For athletes there is an expectation that agents 
will negotiate fair contracts for them with clubs. Results indicated that athletes are of 
the opinion that agents should always aim to secure fair athlete remuneration when 
negotiating contracts for them and with them. This finding is consistent with Reuvid 
and Terterov (2005) who stated that agents are entitled to remuneration as agreed in 
their agency agreement, for concluding transactions which they have been entrusted 
by the athlete.   
As much as the relationship between the athlete and the agent speaks to the 
obligations that the agent has towards the athlete, the athlete also has obligations 
towards the agent. An analysis of athlete-agent contracts revealed clauses that cater 
for athlete obligations. A principal has rights which should be enforced; however, they 
are also liable to obligations which they should perform (Maradas, 2011). Examples of 
these obligations include the duty to honour the agreement between athletes and 
agents and the duty to adhere to club and federation rules and regulations.  
Athletes and agents also agreed that there are risks involved in their relationship, 
which includes the risk of adverse selection, agents operating outside the instructions 
of their athlete, athletes signing agreements that are in conflict with their existing 
agreements or any of the parties transgressing industry regulations. Document 
analysis further revealed that such instances are catered for by clauses that provide 
risk mitigation remedies, for such moral hazards. When one party violates their duty 
to the other party, the non-breaching party is entitled to a remedy, which includes 
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monetary damages, termination of agency relationship, an injunction and required 
accounting (Miller, 2018). This result is consistent with Mason & Slack (2001) finding 
in that the athlete-agent contract is the start of the athlete-agent agency and allows for 
the relationship to be legally binding as well as their finding that these contracts should 
also clearly stipulate what are the duties of both parties, as well as what are the agreed 
incentives and rewards for the services rendered by the agent.   
 
5.2.1.5 Communication  
Results from the interviews and the questionnaire indicate that athletes require 
consistent communication from their agents. Athletes agreed that communication is 
one of the most important determinants of an agency relationship. Athletes were of the 
opinion that they expect agents to communicate all information with them, give prompt 
disclosures and comply with their instructions given to them. Data from the 
questionnaire showed a difference between the level of expectations (high) and 
experiences (low) of the communication between athletes and their agents. 
Schneeman (2013) supports this finding by stating that anyone dealing with agents 
has the right to assume that important and relevant information obtained by agents 
should be shared with principals. Interestingly, the results from interviews with agents 
had similar expectations regarding communication from athletes to agents and they 
agreed that the regular contact between them formed a significant part of the 
communication they require in the relationship. This finding is consistent with Müller 
and Turner (2005), who stated that agency risks can be mitigated through appropriate 
communication schedules (regular contact) which provides a balance of formal and 
informal communication with regular meetings and reports. Similarly, the results from 
the factor analyses indicated that communication between the athlete and the agent 
is a relevant factor and therefore a determent of the athlete-agent relationship.   
 
5.2.1.6 Fiduciary relationship 
The athlete-agent agency relationship involves the fiduciary duty of utmost care for the 
athlete’s best interests by the agent, honesty, trust and loyalty between the athlete 
and the agent. Fiduciary duty is a legal obligation to act in the best interest of another 
party (Grant & Ballard, 2013). Agency is the fiduciary relationship which exists 
between athletes and agents (Nixon, 2015). According to Lanciano et al. (2007) agents 
owe the principal a fiduciary duty of good faith and the duty to act solely in the 
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principal’s best interest. An agency relationship occurs whenever athletes’ contract 
agents to act in their best interest (Carroll, 2016). This statement is consistent with the 
results of the interviews where both the athletes and agents agreed that the agent 
should at all times be acting in the best interest of the athlete. This is reinforced in 
contracts revealing clauses that affirm the fiduciary duty between the athlete and the 
agent. A further consistent finding with agents serving the best interests of athletes 
revealed that the athlete-agent relationship sometimes faces the risk of the agent 
being discriminatory towards the athlete. Agents in sport are allowed to have agency 
agreements with more than one athlete and this creates a potential situation whereby 
agents deliver quality services to athletes that are considered to be economically more 
valuable to agents therefore failing to equally perform their duties for all athletes. This 
finding is inconsistent with literature, since agents should not have any conflict of 
interest in carrying out their duties. A conflict of interest occurs when one attempts to 
serve two masters (Reed & Corley, 2010). 
Masteralexis, Barr & Hums (2009) state that the fiduciary duty also obligates the agent 
to act with loyalty and honesty in a manner consistent with the best interest of the 
beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship. As much as loyalty and honesty are a part of 
the fiduciary duty that agents have towards their athletes, loyalty and honesty between 
the athlete and the agent are significant features of the athlete-agent relationship. 
According to the results from the questionnaire athletes had high expectations of 
loyalty and honesty from their agents. Interviews revealed that one of the challenges 
faced by athletes in athlete-agent relationships is deception from agents. Athletes 
were of the opinion that some agents often over-sell themselves to athletes and when 
the time comes to deliver, they under-deliver. This creates a negative impression in 
the industry about agents and their roles. These types of agents are often the ones 
that try to poach athletes from other agents or allow them to sign agreements whilst 
having existing ones with their agents. Results indicate that both the athletes and the 
agents acknowledged this risk and have catered for the risk by inserting clauses in 
their contracts.  
Fiduciary duty has trust at its core (Moffat, Bean & Dewar, 2005), the trust between 
the athlete and the agent was identified as a consistent theme from the questionnaire 
where athletes rated trust as one of the significant expectations for their relationships 
with agents. This was supported with results from the interviews where both agents 
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and athletes identified trust as an important determinant for a successful agency 
relationship. The importance of trust in this relationship was also evident during factor 
analysis, as trust was identified as one of the factors constituting agency. This finding 
is consistent with Casadesus-Masanell (2004) who reported that agency contracts 
fundamentally depend on the trust between the principal (athlete) and the agent, and 
that this relationship is a fiduciary relationship, which means that the relationship 
between the athlete and the agent is founded on trust. The agent’s fiduciary duty to 
the principal is benchmarked for interpretation and assessment of instructions from 
the agent. These results are consistent with the finding from Barnett (2010) in that the 
agent owe athletes they represent the fiduciary duty to represent them honestly, loyally 
and to the best of their abilities. 
 
5.2.1.7 Mentoring  
The results identified mentorship as a constituent of the athlete-agent agency that 
exists in the athlete-agent relationship, as a unique finding for the study. Chase and 
Evert (2011) explain mentorship as a relationship that includes an influential and 
trusted counsellor, guide, teacher, coach or supporter, that employs their expertise or 
experience in a shared interest and contributes to the development of the person being 
mentored in a personal and professional capacity. The interviews revealed that both 
the athlete and agent acknowledge mentorship as a significant part of their 
relationship, where the agent is the mentor and the athlete is the mentee. One of the 
main findings under mentorship, is the athlete’s reliance on their agents for advice on 
matters on and off the field. Agents also agree that they need to have a mentorship 
relationship with athletes that allows them to approach their agents at any time about 
any aspect of life, whether professional or personal. 
Athletes needs for counselling, makes it important for them to have responsive 
support. Athletes prefer to have agents that are present in their lives and able to 
instantly respond or provide support for any given challenge and opportunity. Gailmard 
(2012) supports this finding when he agrees that agency focuses on the 
responsiveness of agents’ decisions to the principals’ goals. The agents’ responsive 
support is the administrative skill that the athlete requires from the agent, as supported 
by the factor analyses finding. 
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Athletes and agents agree that for their agency objectives to be achieved, they need 
to work as a team. This finding is consistent with Balago (2014) that principals 
(athletes) require the maximum effort and cooperation of agents to achieve their goals. 
From the interviews it is clear that most athletes are impatient and want instant 
gratification, often not understanding what their agent’s capacity is and what the 
dynamics are. This often leads to frustrations for both athletes and agents. 
Consistent with the definition for mentorship is the team work required in the athlete-
agent relationship. It is evident that both athletes and the agents agree that it is 
important for them to develop a common understanding of their expectations for each 
other. Due to the knowledge gap that exists between athletes and agents there is a 
high probability that athletes do not understand what agents have agreed to negotiate 
on their behalf.  
 
5.2.1.8 Cooperation 
The study revealed that athletes have high expectations for full cooperation between 
themselves and their agents. The results from the questionnaire showed high levels 
of athletes’ expectations for full cooperation between themselves and their agents and 
low experiences of cooperation. This could be due to a lack of communication, loyalty, 
trust and ethics between the athlete and the agent. Results from the interviews 
revealed that both athletes and agents consider cooperation as one of the significant 
determinants of their athlete-agent relationship and aspects of cooperation were 
captured through clauses that guide the responsibility of each party. This finding is 
consistent with the literature, as Balago (2014) stated that the principal-agent 
relationship requires maximum effort and cooperation between the principal and the 
agent to achieve the goals of their relationship agreement. Thus, cooperation is one 
of the significant determinants of the athlete-agent relationship. This finding is 
consistent with that of Barnett (2010) that mutual understanding and cooperation 
between the athlete and the agent is paramount to their relationship.  
 
5.2.1.9 Information asymmetry  
Asymmetry in knowledge and skills between athletes and the agents creates the need 
for the athlete-agent relationship. Athletes that have sport talent and development 
potential require agents with the necessary skills and knowledge to assist athletes in 
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achieving their career goals. Results from the study revealed that athletes recognise 
asymmetry in their relationship with agents. Athletes recognise that they need agents 
to perform duties using skills and knowledge that they do not have. Agents also 
acknowledge that the need for their services stems from the knowledge and skills gap 
that exists between them and athletes as negotiators of contracts and marketing 
athletes to sport organisations. This finding is consistent with the literature, as Mnookin 
(2004) states that the advantages of a principal-agent relationship is that the agent 
can provide significant benefits to their principal, which includes an agent having 
specialised knowledge that the principal lacks about market conditions, relevant risks 
and opportunities. Agents by reason of their reputation and relationships may be able 
to provide access and opportunities that would otherwise be unavailable; an agent 
may also be a better negotiator than the principal. Lastly the agent may be able to use 
negotiation tactics on behalf of the principal in a way that shields the principal from 
their full impact. In their findings Mason & Slack (2001) also found that information 
asymmetry will exist in the athlete-agent relationship as a result of agents enjoying the 
advantage of being more knowledgeable than athletes when it comes to matters such 
as financials, legalities or even negotiating deals.  
 
5.2.1.10 Three-way relationship  
The agency relationship in sport is a three-way relationship. It includes the athlete, as 
well as the sport and commercial organisations. The sport organisations provide 
employment opportunities, whilst the commercial organisations provide sponsorship 
and endorsement opportunities for the athlete. However, these opportunities are 
presented and negotiated with the athlete through the agent that has the rights to 
represent and negotiate on their behalf.  
 
5.3 AGENCY FRAMEWORK 
The discussion of the results focuses on the determinants of athlete-agent agency in 
South African sport industry. Namely, mentoring, fiduciary relationship, contracts, 
cooperation, information asymmetry, communication and three-way relationship. The 
athlete-agent agency is a three-way relationship, which includes the athlete, agent and 
the sport or corporate organisation. The two main components of the agency in sport 
is the athlete and the agent. The athlete has the sport talent and development potential 
to become a successful professional, but because of asymmetry between the two, the 
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athlete needs an agent with the capacity and necessary skills and knowledge to assist 
them in reaching their fullest potential. This includes the agent representing the athlete 
when negotiating with sport organisations as potential employers and corporate 
organisations as potential sponsors. It is for this reason that the athlete will seek the 
services of the agent and once there is an agreement, whether verbal or in writing, the 
two parties will have a fiduciary relationship and the agent will have the obligation to 
perform tasks assigned to them by the athlete to their fullest ability for the best interests 
of the athlete. These duties include providing mentorship and guidance to the athlete 
in assisting them in dealing with professional and personal challenges they face. 
Throughout this relationship the athlete and the agent need to ensure that there is a 
co-operative relationship between them, through proper communication to ensure that 
the goals of their agreement remain aligned and achievable. However, the athlete-
agent relationship is contextual and exists in the context of the type of sport, the talent 
of the athlete, type of relations and the capacity, knowledge and skills of the agent. It 
is therefore important for these determinants to be considered when assessing this 
framework. 
The diagram below (figure 5.1), represents the athlete-agent agency relationship in 
sport, the three blue blocks represent the main components of the athlete agent 
relationship, the athlete, the relationships and the agent. The arrows in the diagram 
demonstrate that in this contractual relationship parties benefit from each other in the 
context of the relationship they share. The block covering the three main blocks 
reminds us that the athlete-agent agency is contextual. 
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CONTEXT  
Figure 5.1 An athlete-agent agency framework 
 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed the findings of the study as well as linking these findings to the 
comprehensive literature. This discussion resulted in the development of a conceptual 
framework that can be utilised to understand and manage the relationship between 
athletes and agents within the South African sport industry.  
Agency relationships are common in sport, due to the nature of the industry. When 
one person manages another’s affairs, an agency relationship exists by default. 
Understanding the agency theory's application in sport can give stakeholders greater 
insight as an athlete, agent, team owner, investor, sponsor, union or federation. In 
Athlete 
With sport talent 
and development 
potential 
Agent  
With capacity 
(knowledge and 
skills)  
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sport, an agency relationship takes place whenever one party, an athlete, is engaged 
with another person, a sport agent, who possesses specialised knowledge, 
competencies, or qualities (Swayne & Dodds, 2011). This study considered the 
athlete-agent relationship, which involves – the athlete and the athlete’s agent. In 
sport, athletes hire agents to represent them, both parties want to maximise their own 
objective function, as well as their profit or utility. When the goals of athletes and 
agents are not perfectly aligned, agents may pursue their own goals at the expense of 
athletes. This study focused on the determinants of the athlete-agent agency. 
The following chapter will focus on the conclusions of the study and 
recommendations for further research, regarding sport agency in South Africa.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 
 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The research question that emanated from this study was: “What constitutes athlete-
agent agency in the South African sport industry?” The study also aimed to develop 
an athlete-agent agency framework for the South African sport industry. Two 
objectives were formulated, namely to do an extensive and contextual literature review 
on agency and the determinants of agency and to establish the determinants of the 
athlete-agent agency in South African sport. This chapter summarises the study and 
reflects on the results. 
 
6.2 CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.2.1 Constituents of athlete-agent agency in the South African sport context 
 
The findings of the study revealed the following determinants for the athlete-agent 
agency that is guided by the context in which this relationship is established. These 
are the athlete, agent, contractual relationship, communication, fiduciary relationship, 
mentoring, cooperation, information asymmetry and three-way relationship. These 
determinants are explained below: 
• The relationship between the athlete and the agent takes place in a particular 
context. Below are some of the contexts: 
o The professional athlete with talent and development potential is seen 
as the principal in the athlete-agent relationship. In rugby and football, 
the athlete has to have the adequate talent or development potential to 
be recruited or offered a contract by a sport federation or club. Agents in 
both rugby and football only look to contract with athletes with the talent 
and development potential.  
o The athlete-agent relationship requires agents with the capacity, 
knowledge and skills to deliver on the tasks assigned by the athlete. 
Athletes in rugby and football look for agents with the right 
contacts/network (in professional rugby), ability to negotiate contracts, 
market players to secure employment, endorsements and sponsorships 
98 
 
and the understanding of the different rules and regulations concerned. 
In rugby, agents need to be licensed by the federation to act as an agent. 
In football anyone may act as an intermediary for a professional athlete. 
In both rugby and football, the agent’s fees are regulated by the different 
federations.  
o Agency between the athlete and the agent includes two types of 
contracts namely the athlete-agent contract and athletes’ contracts with 
the sport organisation. The athlete-agent contract is central to the 
athlete-agent relationship and may be in writing or verbal. The athlete-
sport organisation contract is negotiated by agents with the sporting 
organisation on behalf on the athlete. The contract length between the 
athlete and the agent in rugby and football are regulated and have 
different timelines. 
o Communication is one of the most important determinants of an agency 
relationship. Agency risks can be mitigated through appropriate 
communication schedules. The preference for how communication in the 
relationship is carried out may differ from athlete to athlete, or agent to 
agent. Some athletes may prefer regular calls, whilst others may prefer 
regular meetings or a combination of both. 
o Athlete-agent agency involves the fiduciary duty of utmost care for the 
athlete’s best interest by the agent, honesty, trust and loyalty between 
the athlete and the agent. The fiduciary duty also obligates the agent to 
act with loyalty and honesty in a manner consistent with the best 
interests of the beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship. In both rugby and 
football parties to an agency relationship are bounded by their fiduciary 
relationship and duties owed to one another. The fiduciary duty between 
the athlete and the agent may be structured differently from contract to 
contract. 
o Mentorship is a constituent of the athlete-agent agency relationship. 
Athletes require agents to provide a relationship where they act as 
influential and trusted counsellors, guides, teachers, coaches or 
supporters that employ their expertise or experiences in a shared 
interest and contributes to the development of their talent and potential 
into a successful professional career. Depending on the level of 
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professional progression of the athlete, the mentoring requirements may 
differ. More senior athletes may require less mentoring time and may 
require post retirement planning mentoring and younger athletes may 
require more time and mentoring on how to reach their fullest potential. 
o The cooperation between the athlete and the agent is a significant 
determinant of the athlete-agent agency. The cooperation between the 
athlete and the agent remains an important aspect for any athlete-agent 
relationship, in rugby and football. 
o The need for the athlete-agent relationship, is as a result of the 
asymmetry in knowledge and skills between athletes and the agents. 
Professional athletes in rugby and football often have minimal or no 
education, therefore the knowledge gap between them and the agent is 
often quite significant and is the primary reason for the relationship. 
However, some athletes do come into the relationship with a decent 
amount of knowledge and information, such as the ability to understand 
and negotiate own contracts or pre-existing relationships that allow them 
to reach information before their agents, which causes the information 
asymmetry between different athletes and agents to differ.  
o The athlete-agent agency is a three-way relationship that involves the 
sport organisations that hire the athlete and the commercial 
organisations that sponsor the athlete, with the athlete represented by 
the agent in the negotiations. 
 
6.2.2 A framework for athlete-agent agency in the South African sport industry 
• The study developed an athlete-agent agency framework in the South African 
sport industry, that includes determinants unique to the athlete-agent agency, 
such as mentoring and the three-way relationship which can be found in chapter 
5, under figure 5.1. There is no evidence of any other study that focused on the 
athlete-agent agency in South Africa.   
• The figure represents the main components of the athlete-agent agency, 
namely, the athlete, the relationships and the agent. 
• The athlete-agent agency relationship takes place in a particular context and 
this context may differ in different environments. The context of the athlete-
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agent agency relationship is represented by the context box encompassing the 
athlete, agents and their relationships.  
• In summary, the athlete-agent agency framework shows that in order for this 
relationship to exist, there is a requirement for an athlete with sport talent and 
development potential, to contract with an agent with the requisite capacity, 
including the administrative competence to manage careers and negotiate 
employment contracts, as well as the branding skill to assist the athlete in 
developing themselves as attractive brands attractive for commercial 
sponsorships and endorsement deals.  
• However, there are various determinants that impact the types of relationships 
that will characterise the athlete-agent agency, which were derived from the 
literature, questionnaire and interviews, namely, mentoring, fiduciary 
relationship (includes, trust, loyalty and honesty), contractual (includes, 
agreement, cost/incentives, obligations and risk mitigation), cooperation, 
information asymmetry, communication and the three-way relationship.  
  
6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.3.1 Recommendations from the study 
The major recommendations from this study provide organisations and practitioners 
in professional sport with tools on how the athlete-agent agency relationship could be 
better organised. These are:  
 
 Recommendations for practice 
• Athletes and agents should consider the various agency determinants which 
are all important when developing or considering whether to enter into an 
agency relationship  
• The relationship between the athlete and the agent should ideally be defined in 
formal terms, using a contract. Parties should always ensure that the contract 
or agreement is valid and fair, clearly stipulating the ingredients of a valid 
including the responsibilities of the agent to the athlete and the responsibilities 
of the athlete to the agency, the agreement by both parties, the agreed fees or 
payments and not in contravention or violation of any laws. 
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• To manage the information imbalance between the athlete and the agent, the 
parties need to ensure that there is a high level of communication between 
them. This includes ensuring that there is a guide on the ways of 
communicating, as well as regular contact between the athlete and the agent. 
• Athletes look for an agent that can provide them with a mentorship relationship. 
Therefore, agents should aim to improve their knowledge on how to provide 
their athletes with a mentoring programme that will aid them in their learning 
and development.  
• To manage the risk of self-interest in the athlete-agent relationship, sport 
federations should educate athletes in understanding the fiduciary relationship 
and requirements thereof. Through workshops and short courses aimed at 
improving the athletes understanding of the athlete-agent fiduciary relationship 
and related aspects. 
 
Recommendations for policy 
• In governing the athlete-agent relationship, federations should ensure that only 
agents that have the minimum or necessary skills and competence to perform 
agent duties are allowed to practice. This includes administrative and marketing 
skills. Athletes should be assisted in understanding these agent competence 
criteria.  
• Agents want to manage athletes with the required level of talent to succeed as 
professionals while athletes require informed and skilled agents. It is of 
importance for both parties to agree on expected competencies and skills from 
each other before investing in an athlete-agent agency contract.  
• Sport federations, unions and associations should comprehensively consider 
the determinants of the athlete-agent agency, when developing laws that 
govern the relationship. 
 
6.3.2 Recommendations for further study 
There is a need for the following further research: 
• A study interrogating the success and adaptability of the athlete-agent agency 
framework in a different context, i.e. other sport and parties. 
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• A study focusing on the agency relationship between the athlete and the third 
party in the three-way relationship (clubs, federations, unions and commercial 
organisations). 
• A study focusing on determining the specific service quality dimensions that 
would be pertinent in a three-way relationship, with the emphasis on the agent 
and club/federation/union relationship. 
• A study to develop a specific model for measuring the perceived service quality 
that corporates, that sponsor or award endorsements, receive from athletes. 
 
6.4 SUMMARY 
The first chapter of the study introduced the concept of agency theory as well as the 
various important elements within the field of agency theory. Following the adaptation 
of the research methodology, the data collected using a questionnaire, interviews and 
document analysis, provided findings that helped to highlight the important 
determinants of the athlete-agent agency. These determinants include the athlete, 
agent, contractual relationship, communication, fiduciary relationship, mentoring, 
cooperation, information asymmetry and three-way relationship. The study has shown 
that the athlete-agent agency relationship depends on the particular context within 
which it takes place and that there are various determinants impacting the different 
relationships that exist in athlete-agent agency. Examples of these determinants 
include, mentoring, the fiduciary relationship and the contractual element. These 
findings allowed the research to achieve the aim of the study and from these findings 
an athlete-agent agency framework was developed. This concludes the study on the 
athlete-agent agency relationship in the South African sport industry.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: Questionnaire 
 
 
 
  
    Title: Agency of sport agents in the South African sport industry 
 
THE AIM OF THE STUDY is to develop an agency framework for sport agents in South 
Africa.  
The researcher requires you to compete the questionnaire that will take 5-10 minutes.  You will 
complete the questionnaire anonymously and confidentially. Results will be collated in groups 
and no participants will be identified. Participants may access the results upon request.  
Thank you for your time taken to fill in this questionnaire.  Your views will contribute 
immensely towards this study.   
1. Section A: Biographical information  
 
I. In which sport are you a professional? 
 
 
II. How long have you been a professional in your sport in years?  
 
III. What is your age in years?  
 
 
IV. On what level do you professionally participate in sport? 
 
V. Do you have an agent that represents you as an athlete? 
 
VI. For how many years did you have an agent? 
 
 
 
 
2. Section B: Agency expectations 
Please indicate in the appropriate block with an X the extent to which you agree or 
disagree with each statement.  
 
2.1 To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding an excellent agent? 
Football  
Rugby  
 
 
First team  
Fringe   
Yes  
No  
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Determinant Expectations statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Contracts 
 
2.1.1 Excellent agents have 
an agency contract with 
their athletes 
     
2.2.1 Excellent agents have 
fair contracts with 
athletes 
     
2.3.1 Excellent agents require 
fair remuneration from 
their athletes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Determinant Expectations statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Capacity 
 
2.4.1 Excellent agents have 
the capacity to 
represent athletes 
     
2.5.1 Excellent agents are 
licensed by their sport 
federation 
     
2.6.1 Excellent agents secure 
employment contracts 
for their athletes 
     
2.7.1 Excellent agents 
negotiate employment 
contracts for their 
athletes 
     
2.8.1 Excellent agents secure 
sponsorship deals for 
their athletes 
     
2.9.1 Excellent agents 
manage sponsorship 
deals 
     
2.10.1 Excellent agents secure 
endorsement deals 
     
2.11.1 Excellent agents 
manage endorsement 
deals 
     
2.12.1 Excellent agents 
negotiate as per their 
athlete’s instructions 
2.13.1  
     
Determinant Expectations statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
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Loyalty Excellent agents have 
the faith of their 
athletes  
     
2.1.1 Excellent agents are 
loyal to their athletes 
     
2.2.1 Excellent agents have 
the loyalty of their 
athletes 
     
2.3.1 Excellent agents are in 
full cooperation with 
their athletes 
     
Determinant Expectations statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Conflict of 
interest 
2.4.1 Excellent agents put 
their athletes interests 
first at all times 
     
2.5.1 Excellent agents always 
avoid conflict of interest 
     
2.6.1 Excellent agents and 
their athletes should 
have common goals, 
beliefs and values. 
     
2.7.1 Excellent agents should 
not represent athletes 
who have conflicting 
interests. 
     
2.8.1 Excellent agents should 
not have any conflict of 
interest with their 
athletes  
     
2.9.1 Excellent agents should 
disclose all the potential 
conflicts of interest with 
their athletes. 
     
 
 
 
 
 
2.10.1 Excellent agents should 
enjoy the same risk 
attitude as their 
athletes. 
     
Determinant Expectations statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Ethical 2.11.1 Excellent agents always 
account for payments 
received 
     
2.12.1 Excellent agents always 
operate ethically 
     
2.13.1 Excellent agents should 
always be fair. 
     
2.14.1 Excellent agents always 
follow their athlete’s 
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instructions when 
representing them 
Determinant Expectations statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Trust 2.15.1 Excellent agents should 
have the trust of their 
athletes 
     
2.16.1 Excellent agents should 
have the full confidence 
of their athletes to 
represent them. 
     
2.17.1 Excellent agents should 
not misrepresent their 
skills to carry out tasks. 
     
2.18.1 Excellent agent should 
be knowledgeable. 
     
Determinant Expectations statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Communication 2.19.1 Excellent agents should 
communicate all 
information with their 
athletes 
     
2.20.1 Excellent agents should 
always give prompt 
disclosures of all facts 
affecting the agency 
     
2.21.1 Excellent agents should 
comply with reasonable 
instructions given by 
their athletes. 
     
2.22.1 Excellent agents should 
not enjoy the advantage 
of hidden information 
     
2.23.1 Excellent agents should 
not enjoy the advantage 
of hidden actions 
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3. Section C: Agency experiences 
Please indicate in the appropriate block with an X the extent to which you agree or 
disagree 
with each statement.  
 
3.1 To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding your experiences of 
your agent? 
Determinant Experience statements Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Contracts 
 
2.14.1 I have an agency 
contract with my 
agent 
     
2.15.1 I have a fair 
contract with my 
agent 
     
2.16.1 My agent requires 
fair remuneration 
from me 
     
Determinant Experience statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Capacity 
 
2.17.1 My agent has the 
capacity to 
represent me 
     
2.18.1 My agent is 
licensed by our 
sport federation 
     
2.19.1 My agent secured 
my employment 
contract 
     
2.20.1 My agent 
negotiated my 
employment 
contract 
     
2.21.1 My agent secured 
my sponsorship 
deals  
     
2.22.1 My agent manages 
my sponsorship 
deals 
     
2.23.1 My agent secured 
my endorsement 
deals 
     
2.24.1 My agent manages 
my endorsement 
deals 
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2.25.1 My agent 
negotiates as per 
my instructions 
Determinant Experience statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Loyalty 
2.26.1 I have faith in my 
agent 
2.26.1 My agent is loyal to 
me 
2.27.1 My agent has my 
loyalty 
2.28.1 There is full 
cooperation 
between my agent 
and I 
Determinant Experience statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Conflict of 
interest 
2.29.1 My agent puts my 
interests first at all 
times 
2.30.1 My agent always 
avoids conflict of 
interest 
2.31.1 My agent and I 
have common 
goals, beliefs and 
values. 
2.32.1 My agent does not 
represent athletes 
who have 
conflicting 
interests. 
2.33.1 My agent should 
not have any 
conflict of interest 
with their athletes 
2.34.1 My agent discloses 
all the potential 
conflicts of interest 
with me. 
2.35.1 My agent enjoys 
the same risk 
attitude as I do. 
Determinant Experience statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Ethical 2.36.1 My agent always 
accounts for 
payments received 
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2.37.1 My agent always 
operates ethically 
2.38.1 My agent is always 
fair. 
2.39.1 My agent always 
follows my 
instructions when 
representing me 
Determinant Experience statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Trust 2.40.1 I trust my agent 
2.41.1 I have the full 
confidence of in 
my agent to 
represent me. 
2.42.1 My agent does not 
misrepresent their 
skills to carry out 
tasks. 
2.43.1 My agent is 
knowledgeable. 
determinant Experience statements Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Communication 2.44.1 My agent 
communicates all 
information with 
me. 
2.45.1 My agent always 
gives prompt 
disclosures of all 
facts affecting the 
agency 
2.46.1 My agent complies 
with reasonable 
instructions given 
by me. 
2.47.1 My agent does not 
enjoy the 
advantage of 
hidden information 
2.48.1 My agent does not 
enjoy the 
advantage of 
hidden actions 
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APPENDIX 2: Interview guide 
Athletes interview questions 
1) In which sport are you a professional and for how many years have you been
a professional in your sport?
2) What is your age in years and what is your level of participation in sport?
3) Do you have an agent? If you do what do you expect from your agent?
4) What are the good practices in your relationship with your agent?
5) What are the challenges in your relationship with your agent?
6) What recommendations do you have for the agency between athletes and
agents?
Agents interview questions 
1) In which sport are you an agent for professional athletes and for how many
years have you been an agent in sport?
2) What is your age in years and at which level of participation in sport is your
athlete?
3) What do you expect as agent from your athlete?
4) What are the good practices in your relationship with your athlete?
5) What are the challenges in your relationship with your athlete?
6) What recommendations do you have for the agency between athletes and
agents?
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APPENDIX 3:  Information sheet – Interviews 
DEPARTMENT OF SPORT AND MOVEMENT STUDIES 
RESEARCH STUDY INFORMATION LETTER 
22 January 2018 
Good Day 
My name is Donald Moeletsi I WOULD LIKE TO INVITE YOU TO PARTICIPATE in a research study on 
agency of sport agents in the South African sport industry 
Before you decide on whether to participate, I would like to explain to you why the research is being 
done and what it will involve for you. I will go through the information letter with you and answer 
any questions you have. This should take about 30 to 45 minutes. The study is part of a research 
project being completed as a requirement for a Doctoral Degree in Sport Management through the 
University of Johannesburg. 
THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY is to develop an agency framework for sport agents for the South 
African sport industry. Below, I have compiled a set of questions and answers that I believe will assist 
you in understanding the relevant details of participation in this research study. Please read through 
these. If you have any further questions, I will be happy to answer them for you. 
DO I HAVE TO TAKE PART? No, you don’t have to. It is up to you to decide to participate in the 
study. I will describe the study and go through this information sheet. If you agree to take part, I will 
then ask you to sign a consent form.  
WHAT EXACTLY WILL I BE EXPECTED TO DO IF I AGREE TO PARTICIPATE? You will participate in an 
audio-taped interview. The researcher will record the conversation using an audio tape recorder. 
The purpose of the recording is to allow the researcher to capture all the information discussed 
during the interview, which is important for them to analyse later. The interview will take about 30 
to 45 minutes. You will be expected to answer the questions as honestly as possible.  The 
information provided by the participant will be recorded with participants permission. 
WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF I WANT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE STUDY? If you decide to participate, you 
are free to withdraw your consent at any time without giving a reason and without any 
consequences. If you wish to withdraw your consent, you should inform me as soon as possible. 
IF I CHOOSE TO PARTICIPATE, WILL THERE BE ANY EXPENSES FOR ME, OR PAYMENT DUE TO ME: 
You will not be paid to participate in this study and you will not bear any expenses. 
RISKS INVOLVED IN PARTICIPATION: During the interview, sometimes, you might be asked 
questions about certain topics which are sensitive or may upset you. You can refuse to answer any 
questions which you feel uncomfortable with, or you can stop the interview anytime. 
BENEFITS INVOLVED IN PARTICIPATION: Participants will have access to information pertaining to 
the study and will have better knowledge of agency. You will help to contribute towards the body of 
knowledge (BOK). Hence, the results of the study will assist in analysing the relationship between 
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the sport agent and athlete. And will also offer guidelines for sport agency within South African 
sport. 
WILL MY PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL? Yes. Names on the data sheet will 
be removed once analysis starts. All data and back-ups thereof will be kept in password protected 
folders and/or locked away as applicable. Only I or my research supervisor will be authorized to use 
and/or disclose your anonymised information in connection with this research study. Any other 
person wishing to work with you anonymised information as part of the research process (e.g. an 
independent data coder) will be required to sign a confidentiality agreement before being allowed to 
do so. 
WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO THE RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH STUDY? The results will be written into a 
research report that will be assessed. In some cases, results may also be published in a scientific 
journal. In either case, you will not be identifiable in any documents, reports or publications. You will 
be given access to the study results if you would like to see them, by contacting me.  
WHO IS ORGANISING AND FUNDING THE STUDY?  The study is being organised by me, under the 
guidance of my research supervisor at the Department of sport and movement studies in the 
University of Johannesburg. The researcher is funding the study. 
WHO HAS REVIEWED AND APPROVED THIS STUDY? Before this study was allowed to start, it was 
reviewed in order to protect your interests. This review was done first by the Department of sport 
and movement studies, and then secondly by the Faculty of Health Sciences Research Ethics 
Committee at the University of Johannesburg. In both cases, the study was approved. 
WHAT IF THERE IS A PROBLEM? If you have any concerns or complaints about this research study, 
its procedures or risks and benefits, you should ask me. You should contact me at any time if you 
feel you have any concerns about being a part of this study. My contact details are:  
Donald Moeletsi 
0636845868 
donald.moeletsi@gmail.com 
You may also contact my research supervisor: 
Prof Wim Hollander 
whollander@uj.co.za 
If you feel that any questions or complaints regarding your participation in this study have not been 
dealt with adequately, you may contact the Chairperson of the Faculty of Health Sciences Research 
Ethics Committee at the University of Johannesburg: 
Prof. Christopher Stein 
Tel: 011 559-6564 
Email: cstein@uj.ac.za  
FURTHER INFORMATION AND CONTACT DETAILS: Should you wish to have more specific 
information about this research project information, have any questions, concerns or complaints 
about this research study, its procedures, risks and benefits, you should communicate with me using 
any of the contact details given above. 
Researcher: 
Donald Moeletsi 
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APPENDIX 4: Information sheet – Questionnaire 
DEPARTMENT OF SPORT AND MOVEMENT STUDIES 
RESEARCH STUDY INFORMATION LETTER 
22 January 2018 
Good Day 
My name is Donald Moeletsi I WOULD LIKE TO INVITE YOU TO PARTICIPATE in a research study on 
agency of sport agents in the South African sport industry 
Before you decide on whether to participate, please take some time to go through the information 
letter, which will explain to you why the research is being done and what it will involve for you. This 
should take about 10 to 15 minutes. The study is part of a research project being completed as a 
requirement for a Doctoral Degree in Sport Management through the University of Johannesburg. 
THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY is to develop an agency framework for sport agents for the South 
African sport industry. Below, I have compiled a set of questions and answers that I believe will assist 
you in understanding the relevant details of participation in this research study. Please read through 
these. If you have any further questions, I will be happy to answer them for you. 
DO I HAVE TO TAKE PART? No, you don’t have to. It is up to you to decide to participate in the 
study. This information sheet will describe the study to you and completion of the questionnaire will 
act consent to you agreeing to take part in the study.  
WHAT EXACTLY WILL I BE EXPECTED TO DO IF I AGREE TO PARTICIPATE? You will participate in the 
completion of an online study questionnaire. The researcher will email you the link to the online 
questionnaire. The purpose of the online questionnaire is to allow the participant to complete the it 
at their own time and convenience as well as to guarantee the participant anonymity. On 
completion of the online questionnaire the researcher will capture all the information on the 
questionnaire, which is important for them to analyse later. The completion of the questionnaire will 
take about 30 minutes. You will be expected to answer the questions as honestly as possible.   
WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF I WANT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE STUDY? If you decide to participate, 
withdrawal from the study will not be possible. The researcher will administer the questionnaire 
using an online tool that does not allow the researcher to see from whom the responses can from. 
Therefore, for this reason, withdrawal of consent will not be possible once the questionnaire has 
been submitted.  
IF I CHOOSE TO PARTICIPATE, WILL THERE BE ANY EXPENSES FOR ME, OR PAYMENT DUE TO ME: 
You will not be paid to participate in this study and you will not bear any expenses 
RISKS INVOLVED IN PARTICIPATION: During the interview, sometimes, you might be asked 
questions about certain topics which are sensitive or may upset you. You can refuse to answer any 
questions which you feel uncomfortable with, or you can stop the interview anytime. 
BENEFITS INVOLVED IN PARTICIPATION: The participants will be allowed access to the information 
or results derived from this study.  The participants can use the knowledge in their agency 
relationship. The study will contribute to better knowledge of agency in the sporting industry. You 
will help to contribute towards the body of knowledge (BOK). Hence, the results of the study will 
assist in analysing the relationship between the sport agent and athlete. And will also offer 
guidelines for sport agency within South African sport 
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WILL MY PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL? Yes. The questionnaire will not 
ask for the provision of any names. All data and back-ups thereof will be kept in password protected 
folders and/or locked away as applicable. Only I or my research supervisor will be authorised to use 
and/or disclose your anonymised information in connection with this research study. Any other 
person wishing to work with you anonymised information as part of the research process (e.g. an 
independent data coder) will be required to sign a confidentiality agreement before being allowed to 
do so. The information derived from this study will be stored with the department of sport and 
movement in a safe. 
WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO THE RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH STUDY? The results will be written into a 
research report that will be assessed. In some cases, results may also be published in a scientific 
journal. In either case, you will not be identifiable in any documents, reports or publications. You will 
be given access to the study results if you would like to see them, by contacting me.  
WHO IS ORGANISING AND FUNDING THE STUDY?  The study is being organised by me, under the 
guidance of my research supervisor at the Department of sport and movement studies in the 
University of Johannesburg. The researcher is funding the study. 
WHO HAS REVIEWED AND APPROVED THIS STUDY? Before this study was allowed to start, it was 
reviewed in order to protect your interests. This review was done first by the Department of sport 
and movement studies, and then secondly by the Faculty of Health Sciences Research Ethics 
Committee at the University of Johannesburg. In both cases, the study was approved. 
WHAT IF THERE IS A PROBLEM? If you have any concerns or complaints about this research study, 
its procedures or risks and benefits, you should ask me. You should contact me at any time if you 
feel you have any concerns about being a part of this study. My contact details are:  
Donald Moeletsi 
0636845868 
donald.moeletsi@gmail.com 
You may also contact my research supervisor: 
Prof Wim Hollander 
whollander@uj.co.za 
If you feel that any questions or complaints regarding your participation in this study have not been 
dealt with adequately, you may contact the Chairperson of the Faculty of Health Sciences Research 
Ethics Committee at the University of Johannesburg: 
Prof. Christopher Stein 
Tel: 011 559-6564 
Email: cstein@uj.ac.za  
FURTHER INFORMATION AND CONTACT DETAILS: Should you wish to have more specific 
information about this research project information, have any questions, concerns or complaints 
about this research study, its procedures, risks and benefits, you should communicate with me using 
any of the contact details given above. 
Researcher: 
Donald Moeletsi 
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APPENDIX 5  
APPENDIX 5: Copies of requests for permission to do research 
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Cnr Kingsway & University Rd 
Rossmore 
Johannesburg 
2001 
Gauteng 
South Africa 
18 February 2019 
MACCABI FOOTBALL CLUB PTY (LTD) 
1st Floor, 24 Crescent drive,  
Melrose Arch 
2037 
Johannesburg 
South Africa 
For attention: Mr Elasto Kapowezha 
REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH 
Dear Mr Elasto Kapowezha 
My name is Donald Moeletsi, and I am a Doctoral Degree (DPhil) in Sport Management student at the 
University of Johannesburg. The research I wish to conduct for my Doctoral thesis involves an agency 
framework for sport agents in South Africa. This project will be conducted under the supervision of 
Prof. Willem Hollander (University of Johannesburg, South Africa). 
I am hereby seeking your consent to approach a number of professional football athletes contracted 
by the Ajax Cape Town to provide participants for this project. 
I have provided you with a copy of my thesis proposal which includes copies of the measure and 
consent and assent forms to be used in the research process, as well as a copy of the approval letter 
which I received from the University of Johannesburg Research Ethics Committee. 
Upon completion of the study, I undertake to provide the Ajax Cape Town with a bound copy of the 
full research report. If you require any further information, please do not hesitate to contact me on 
0636845868 and donald.moeletsi@gmail.com. Thank you for your time and consideration in this 
matter. 
Yours sincerely, 
Donald Moeletsi 
University of Johannesburg 
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APPENDIX 6: Copies of requests of approvals to do research 
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Appendix 7: Consent forms to participate in the study 
DEPARTMENT OF SPORT AND MOVEMENT STUDIES 
RESEARCH CONSENT FORM OR INTERVIEWS TO BE AUDIO-TAPED 
Sport agency in South Africa 
Please initial each box below: 
      I hereby give consent for my interview, conducted as part of the above study, to be 
audio-taped. 
      I understand that my personal details and identifying data will be changed in order to 
protect my identity. The audio tapes used for recording my interview will be destroyed two years 
after publication of the research. 
 I have read this consent form and have been given the opportunity to ask questions. 
_______________________  ___________________________________  ________________ 
Name of Participant  Signature of Participant    Date 
_______________________      ___________________________________ ________________ 
Name of Researcher      Signature of Researcher   Date 
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DEPARTMENT OF SPORT AND MOVEMENT STUDIES 
RESEARCH CONSENT FORM FOR QUESTIONNAIRES 
Agency of sport agents in the South African sport industry 
Please initial each box below: 
      I confirm that I have read and understand the information letter dated 22 January 2018 
for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have 
had these answered satisfactorily. 
      I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw from this 
study at any time without giving any reason and without any consequences to me. 
 I agree to take part in the above study. 
_______________________  ___________________________________  ________________ 
Name of Participant  Signature of Participant    Date 
_______________________      ___________________________________ ________________ 
Name of Researcher      Signature of Researcher   Date 
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APPENDIX 8: Final approval letter from Research Ethics Committee (REC) 
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APPENDIX 9: Final approval letter from Faculty Higher Degrees Committee 
(FHDC) 
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